Practical privacy and security for opportunistic networks by Parris, Iain
PRACTICAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY FOR
OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORKS
Iain Parris
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2014




Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5357
This item is protected by original copyright
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence
Practical privacy and security for
opportunistic networks
Iain Parris
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD
at the




When in physical proximity, data can be directly exchanged between the mobile
devices people carry — for example over Bluetooth. If people cooperate to store,
carry and forward messages on one another’s behalf, then an opportunistic net-
work may be formed, independent of any fixed infrastructure.
To enable performant routing within opportunistic networks, use of social net-
work information has been proposed for social network routing protocols. But the
decentralised and cooperative nature of the networks can however expose users
of such protocols to privacy and security threats, which may in turn discourage
participation in the network.
In this thesis, we examine how to mitigate privacy and security threats in oppor-
tunistic networks while maintaining network performance. We first demonstrate
that privacy-aware routing protocols are required in order to maintain network
performance while respecting users’ privacy preferences. We then demonstrate
novel social network routing protocols that mitigate specific threats to privacy and
security while maintaining network performance.
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People are increasingly carrying wireless communication devices, such as mobile
phones, during their daily lives. Currently, communication between these devices
relies upon the existence of fixed infrastructure, such as mobile phone networks
or Wi-Fi access points. But this means that in infrastructure-less scenarios, where
infrastructure is unavailable or otherwise undesirable to use (e.g., due to cost),
then communication is not possible.
These devices may alternatively communicate with one another in an ad hoc man-
ner: two devices may directly exchange messages when in physical proximity, via
wireless protocols such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct, without requiring any fixed
infrastructure. If many such devices, acting as network nodes, cooperate to carry
each other’s messages, then a decentralised opportunistic network is formed, in a
disconnected store-carry-and-forward architecture.
The decentralised and cooperative nature of such networks, where there may be no
traditional infrastructure and where nodes are expected to cooperate and forward
data for each other, can however expose the network users to privacy and security
threats. This in turn may discourage participation in the network.
This thesis examines the following research questions:
Q1: How can we determine the performance impact of changes in behaviour due
to users’ privacy concerns, when we do not have a deployed opportunistic net-
1
2work?
Q2: Can privacy and security concerns that arise through the use of opportunistic
networks be mitigated through cooperative social behaviour, while maintaining
network performance?
1.1 Thesis
We offer the following thesis statement:
Privacy and security threats within opportunistic networks can be miti-
gated through cooperative social behaviour, without reducing network
performance.
To support this thesis, we make three research contributions. We demonstrate that:
1. If opportunistic network users reduce their participation in the network due
to privacy concerns, then this may impact the network performance.
2. Privacy can be preserved for network participants, while maintaining perfor-
mance, through use of modified routing protocols.
3. Social network information may be used to mitigate a security threat, where
a malicious attacker floods the network with messages.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows.
Chapters 2 and 3 outline related research, and the current state of the art.
• Chapter 2 describes the research background for opportunistic networks.
This includes outlining how opportunistic networks relate to other kinds of
3network; how social networks may be used to enable performant opportunis-
tic network routing; and privacy and security threats to which opportunistic
network users may be exposed.
• Chapter 3 summarises research related to opportunistic network privacy and
security, including the current state of the art.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 document the analysis and work carried out in support of the
stated thesis.
• Chapter 4 demonstrates that privacy concerns may impact network perfor-
mance, should opportunistic network users reduce their participation in the
network due to a perceived privacy threat.
• Chapter 5 details modified routing protocols, demonstrating that privacy
may be preserved while maintaining routing performance.
• Chapter 6 demonstrates that a threat to security — a flooding attack — can be
mitigated when using a social network routing protocol, while maintaining
routing performance.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the research contributions of this
thesis, and discusses potential research that may be performed in the future.
1.3 Publications
I have contributed to the following publications during the course of my research.
In those publications for which I am listed as the first author, the main contribu-
tions in design, analysis and implementation are my own; otherwise I have con-
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case, I gratefully acknowledge the contributions of my fellow authors.
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In this chapter, we discuss the research background. We begin by motivating
opportunistic networking research, outlining its origins in relation to other wire-
less networking research. We then describe the routing challenge within oppor-
tunistic networks, and give an overview of how social network information may be
used to enable performant routing. Finally, we discuss some of the intrinsic secu-
rity and privacy threats to which users of opportunistic networks may be exposed.
2.1 The evolution of opportunistic networks
Increasing numbers of people carry mobile devices — such as mobile phones, lap-
tops, and tablet computers — during their daily lives. These devices may partici-
pate in wireless networks.
Commonly-deployed wireless networks currently require fixed infrastructure. For
example, devices may utilise cellular networks, which requires fixed cellular radio
towers (Figure 2.1(a)). Or devices may connect via IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) infrastruc-
ture mode, which requires fixed access points.
In scenarios where fixed infrastructure does not exist, or does exist but is unattrac-
tive to use (e.g., due to being unreliable, congested, or prohibitively expensive),
then it is possible for mobile devices to communicate directly with one another
7
8(a) Traditional network with infrastructure.
Phones communicate only via fixed infras-
tructure.
(b) Without infrastructure. Phones can com-
municate directly with one another while in
physical proximity.
Figure 2.1: Mobile phones communicating with and without fixed infrastructure.
peer-to-peer, via physical layer protocols such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Direct (Fig-
ure 2.1(b)).
We summarise the areas of wireless networking research focused on creating log-
ical wireless networks on top of such physical protocols, beginning with mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs).
2.1.1 Mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are self-configuring wireless networks of mobile
devices. Messages can only be passed directly between two devices — or nodes —
when they are neighbours, i.e., when they are in sufficiently-close physical prox-
imity for the physical layer wireless protocol. The network is formed through
the cooperation of nodes, with each node available to act as a router to forward
messages on behalf of other nodes — as in a mesh network. This enables non-
neighbouring nodes, which are too distant for direct communication with one
another, to be able to exchange messages, with messages passed hop-by-hop through
the network. MANETs may be viewed as a generalisation of wireless mesh net-
works, where all nodes are mobile. As a consequence of node mobility, MANET
network topology is dynamic: as nodes physically move, their neighbours may
9change as they leave proximity of previous neighbouring nodes and enter prox-
imity of new neighbouring nodes. MANET routing protocols have therefore been
developed to take account of the dynamic network topology.
There are a wide variety of MANET routing protocols [72]. These protocols fall
into two major categories:
Proactive (table-driven) In proactive routing protocols, each node maintains a
regularly-updated routing table of routes for every other node in the net-
work, via background exchange of routing control messages.
Routing tables are maintained at every node, for all other nodes, irrespective
of whether data messages are exchanged between a given pair of nodes. This
allows low-latency usage of any given route, at the expense of background
routing control message overhead even when data messages are not being
sent.
An example protocol of this type is the Optimized Link State Routing Pro-
tocol (OLSR) [39]. Nodes discover their immediate neighbours via regular
Hello messages, and receive lists of their neighbours’ neighbours (i.e., nodes
two hops away) via their neighbours’ responses. Each node’s local view of
the network topology is flooded throughout the network — via an optimisa-
tion of using a set of elected nodes, multipoint relays, to reduce the number of
redundant topology control messages sent throughout the network. Each node
can thus construct a view of the global network topology, and can locally
determine optimal routing paths to every other node.
Reactive (on demand) In reactive routing protocols, routes are found on demand
at the time of use. When a node wishes to send data to another node, it may
invoke a route discovery process, to find a route to that node. This increases the
latency for first-use of a new route, but eliminates routing control message
overhead during times when the network is silent.
Example protocols of this type are Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing [115] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [80].
In AODV, to establish a new route to a destination node, a route request mes-
sage is first broadcast by the sender node. This message is retransmitted and
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flooded through the network by intermediate nodes, each appending their
identifier to every retransmitted copy of the message to note the path taken
through the network. Once the message is received by the intended desti-
nation, a route reply message is sent along the reverse path, and local routing
tables at each node along the reverse path cache the route. This results in mul-
tiple temporary routes being established, and for subsequent data exchange
each forwarding node may choose which among these temporary routes to
use, usually on the basis of the fewest hops to the destination.
In DSR, route request and route reply messages are sent similarly to AODV.
But unlike AODV, each message is source routed — i.e., the route that a mes-
sage should take through the network is specified by the sender alongside the
message. This means that a discovered route need only be “remembered” by
the sender, and intermediate nodes need not maintain any local routing state.
A combination of proactive and reactive routing may be used within a single rout-
ing protocol. For example, with the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [67] each node
maintains a predefined zone of nodes within a fixed number of hops, and uses
proactive routing within the zone. Reactive routing is used to communicate with
nodes outside the zone.
A fundamental assumption underlying all MANET routing protocols is that an
end-to-end route must exist between source and destination. If no such route exists,
then the network is partitioned and communication between the two endpoints is
not possible.
A different approach to networking is needed when this assumption does not hold;
this led to the creation of delay tolerant networks.
2.1.2 Delay Tolerant Networks
Delay (or Disruption) Tolerant Networks (DTNs) enable networking even in sce-
narios where we relax the following assumptions [57]:
• End-to-end paths exist between all nodes.
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• The round-trip time between any pair of nodes is small.
• Packet loss is low.
DTNs were originally proposed for interplanetary communications [32]. A com-
munication link between planets necessarily involves high delay, due to the large
distances (of the order of light-minutes). Additionally, the link may only be oper-
ative at certain times, due to orbital mechanics and requiring line-of-sight.
More generally, DTNs include networks where some links may be high-delay, i.e.,
where the network may frequently (or perpetually) experience long-duration par-
titioning [77]. For example, in a military scenario, two units on a battlefield may be
able to communicate internally within each unit via traditional MANET protocols,
but be out of range for direct communication between units. Communication by
each unit with a helicopter may intermittently be possible as the helicopter passes
overhead [114].
In order to enable networking in these conditions, DTNs employ a store-and-
forward strategy. Messages are stored at DTN nodes until the intermittent link
is operational, and then forwarded.
For example, RFC 4838 [34] defines a message-oriented overlay, the bundle lay-
er. The network is split into regions, with regions separated by intermittent links.
Traditional protocols (e.g., MANET routing protocols) are used internally within
regions. Between regions, across the intermittent links, store-and-forward bundle
protocols are used.
Such protocols enable networking in the example DTNs above, where there are
relatively few intermittent links. But what about in the case where all links may be
intermittent? This is the premise for opportunistic networks.
As a note on terminology: the terms DTN and opportunistic network are often used
interchangeably in the research literature. Following [114], we regard opportunis-
tic networks as a subset of DTNs, where all links are subject to high delay. Fig-
ure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between opportunistic networks and DTNs, in







Figure 2.2: Venn diagram illustrating opportunistic networks in relation to other
network types.
2.1.3 Opportunistic networks
Opportunistic networks [114] are essentially disconnected MANETs, which utilise
a store-carry-and-forward paradigm. Mobile nodes opportunistically exchange
messages with one another during encounters, i.e., when they are in physical prox-
imity. The exchanged messages are then stored and carried by each node, and may
be opportunistically forwarded to other nodes during future encounters. As in
MANETs, each node is mobile; as in DTNs, no contemporaneous end-to-end path
need ever exist between source and destination.
This leads to the defining feature of opportunistic networks: the network topology is
anticipated to change whilst each message is in flight. As a consequence of this, there
is no global knowledge of network topology. Each node must therefore rely on
only local knowledge in order to make routing decisions, i.e., to choose whether
or not to forward each carried message during each opportunistic encounter with
another node.
Example special cases of opportunistic networks include:
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Wildlife monitoring Small mobile sensing devices may be attached to animals.
Sensed data may be opportunistically shared between devices when animals
are in proximity to one another, to create the network and thus enable low-
cost non-intrusive wildlife monitoring. For example, in ZebraNet custom
collars were attached to zebras [82].
Message ferrying Special message ferries — mobile nodes with non-random move-
ment patterns — may be used to opportunistically “ferry” data within a net-
work [154]. For example, buses may store-and-forward data between remote
communities.
Vehicular networks (VANETs) Vehicles may contain embedded devices, able to
opportunistically communicate with one another as part of the network when-
ever two vehicles pass within physical proximity [31].
Throughout this thesis, however, our focus when discussing opportunistic net-
works is those networks formed by humans carrying personal mobile devices,
such as mobile phones, during their daily lives. In a term coined by Hui et al., such
opportunistic networks are also known as Pocket Switched Networks [74]. There
are not yet any real-world large-scale deployments of such networks, although
small-scale research prototypes have been implemented, such as for the Haggle
Project [135].
Such networks can be used to create new applications — such as social media or
information dissemination [45] — even in the absence of existing infrastructure,
and even in disconnected scenarios where traditional MANETs would fail.
In the next section, we discuss routing approaches for these opportunistic net-
works.
2.2 Opportunistic network routing
We have seen that opportunistic networks present challenges for routing: network
topology is dynamic, and so each node must rely on only local knowledge in order
to make routing decisions during their encounters with other nodes.
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The efficiency and performance of an opportunistic network depend on accurately
determining which encountered nodes will be useful in forwarding. In this sec-
tion, we survey routing protocols introduced to enable performant opportunistic
network routing. We first discuss methods used to evaluate routing protocol per-
formance, and then introduce example routing strategies.
2.2.1 Evaluating routing performance
As discussed in Section 2.1.3, there are not yet any any real-world large-scale
opportunistic network deployments. The primary method used to evaluate the
performance of opportunistic network routing protocols is therefore trace-driven
simulation.
The traces used in such simulations are time-ordered lists of encounters between
nodes, i.e., personal mobile devices. These traces may be synthetic (generated arti-
ficially by an analytic model of human mobility), or may be based on empirically-
measured real-world human movements. Given such an encounters list, routing
protocols may be simulated and thus directly compared, based on a variety of per-
formance metrics.
Metrics commonly used for evaluating the performance of opportunistic network
routing protocols include [75]:
Delivery ratio The proportion of messages that are successfully delivered, out of
the total number of unique messages created.
Delivery delay The length of time taken for a message to reach its destination
destination: the wall-clock time elapsed between when the message is first
sent and when it first arrives at its intended final destination.
Opportunistic network routing protocols may involve a trade-off between perfor-
mance, as measured by each of these metrics, and delivery cost, where the delivery
cost is a measure of how many messages (including redundant messages) are used
in order to deliver each message created. To formalise the notion of delivery cost,
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it may be defined as the total number of messages (including duplicates) transmit-
ted, normalised by the total number of unique messages created.
2.2.2 Routing protocols
Examples of opportunistic network routing protocols include:
Epidemic [141] Message copies are forwarded between nodes during each and
every encounter. Since messages are forwarded out along all paths, this
approach indeed ensures (in ideal conditions, e.g., the absence of energy con-
straints) that, if a path exists between source and destination, the message
will certainly find and follow this path to be delivered as quickly as possible.
But sending large numbers of redundant messages, as epidemic routing is apt
to do, is wasteful, and will drain the batteries of the mobile devices rapidly.
This approach is optimal for delivery ratio and delivery delay performance,
but very poor for delivery cost.
Direct delivery [141] Some variations of epidemic routing aim to reduce deliv-
ery cost — potentially at the expense of delivery ratio and delivery delay —
by setting a maximum hop count for forwarding paths. In the limit, where
the maximum hop count is one, the message may only be delivered directly
from source to destination. This is the trivial case of opportunistic network-
ing, where no intermediate forwarding nodes are used. This is optimal for
delivery cost, since necessarily no redundant messages will be generated, but
very poor for delivery ratio and delivery delay.
Spray and Wait [131] The goal of Spray and Wait is to bound the maximum num-
ber of copies of each message throughout the entire opportunistic network,
i.e., to set a fixed upper limit for delivery cost. The source “sprays” a fixed
maximum number of message copies into the network, by forwarding the
message to the first nodes it encounters. Then each of these intermediate
nodes “waits”, and will only deliver the message directly to its destination.
This protocol can be thought of as similar to epidemic routing with a maxi-
mum hop count of two, but also imposes a limit on the number of interme-
diate nodes to which the source may forward message copies.
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MaxProp [31] MaxProp can be thought of as an optimisation of epidemic rout-
ing, to better cope with non-ideal conditions where transfer duration or net-
work buffers may be limited. In these non-ideal conditions, nodes may not be
able to exchange copies of all carried messages during encounters. MaxProp
defines an order for message transmission, prioritising messages by send-
ing them earlier during encounters, and therefore maximising the number of
prioritised messages exchanged during a limited encounter. Message priori-
tisation is based on heuristics — for example messages with low hop count
are prioritised.
PRoPHET [95] The Probabilistic Routing Protocol using History of Encounters
and Transitivity (PRoPHET) aims to reduce delivery cost, i.e., unnecessary
message replication. This is achieved by relying on the assumption that pre-
vious encounters between nodes indicate an increased probability of future
encounters between the same nodes, i.e., encounters are non-random. Each
node maintains an estimated probability — delivery predictability — for every
destination, which is increased during each encounter with the destination
node but decreased (“aged”) with time. Message copies are forwarded between
nodes only when the newly-encountered node has a higher delivery pre-
dictability for the destination than the node currently carrying the message,
i.e., when the newly-encountered node is believed to be more likely to deliver
the message to its destination.
RAPID [9] The Resource Allocation Protocol for Intentional DTN routing (RAPID)
can, like MaxProp, be considered to be an optimisation of epidemic routing
to prioritise messages, in order to better cope with the non-ideal bandwidth-
limited condition where not all messages may be exchanged during encoun-
ters. The goal of RAPID is to optimise routing performance as measured
by one explicitly-chosen performance metric, e.g., delivery ratio or deliv-
ery delay. This is achieved by prioritising messages to forward based on
an explicit utility function, intended to estimate performance as measured
by the chosen performance metric.
The routing protocols described above make use of network or mobility charac-
teristics. Another strategy is to use social network information — information about
17
social relations between the people who carry the mobile devices which make up
the network — to inform routing decisions. This is the premise for social network
routing.
2.2.3 Social network routing
In the context of social network routing, social networks are essentially graphs
of social ties between nodes (users). In contrast to the opportunistic network
topology — which, as discussed in Section 2.1.3, is highly dynamic, even on the
timescales of typical message delivery — the social network graph is relatively
stable, and infrequently updated.
The underlying assumption behind social network routing is that encounters are
more likely between devices carried by users who have a social relation [43, 129]. The
intuition behind the assumption is that people who know one another are more
likely to make arrangements to meet (e.g., arranging a social activity), and/or that
people who meet often may be more likely than random to again meet in future
(e.g., work colleagues or commuters sharing a bus). The social network informa-
tion may then be used in an attempt to inform more efficient routing decisions
(i.e., to enable routing with high delivery ratio, low delivery cost, and low deliv-
ery delay).
There are two major categories of social network that may be utilised by social
network routing protocols: detected social networks (DSNs) and self-reported social
networks (SRSNs) [20].
DSNs are social networks detected by devices, based on logging historical encoun-
ters with other devices. The assumption is that if a device has frequently
been encountered before, then it may likely be encountered again. DSNs are
also sometimes referred to as “contact networks” [129].
SRSNs are social networks that have been manually recorded by users, to indicate
their social relations. For example, on the popular Facebook1 website, people
explicitly note their social relations, as their friends. The assumption in social
1http://www.facebook.com
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network routing is that friends (social relations, i.e., one-hop neighbours on
the social network graph) are more likely to physically encounter one another
than random nodes.
An advantage of utilising DSNs is that any frequently-encountered device may
be used for forwarding, even if belonging to a person not necessarily known to
the message sender. For example, two people sharing a part of a regular daily
commute may be “familiar strangers” — not personally knowing one another, yet
encountering one another frequently [102]. DSNs could detect this scenario, and
exploit the regularity of encounters for opportunistic network forwarding. On the
other hand, DSNs necessarily require a warm-up period in order to detect regu-
larity of encounters. SRSNs, in contrast, while not able to exploit such “familiar
strangers”, are available to be used immediately upon joining the network. An
additional possibility is to combine use of both DSNs and SRSNs, in order to gain
the advantages of both: SRSNs can be used for bootstrapping the network, while
after a warm-up period DSNs can be used to base decisions on historical encounter
data.
A variety of social network routing protocols have been proposed, using social
networks as categorised above. Examples include:
Bubble Rap [75] Bubble Rap utilises DSNs. Encounter patterns are analysed to
detect communities, which are groups of nodes likely to meet frequently. Each
node is assigned to at least one community. Additionally, the centrality of
each node (both globally, and for each community to which it belongs) is
measured; this is a metric for how likely the node is to be on the shortest path
between two other nodes. The node centrality is also found to correlate with
how “popular” the node is, such that a node which frequently encounters
many other nodes has a high centrality.
Messages are first bubbled up, by being forwarded to encountered nodes if the
encountered node is more “popular” (i.e., has higher global centrality) than
the current node. Once the message reaches a node in the same community
as the destination, the message is then forwarded only within the commu-
nity (now exchanged during each encounter if the encountered node is in
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the same community as the destination, and has a higher local community
centrality than the current node) until it reaches its destination.
The intuition is that the most likely nodes to use for forwarding are initial-
ly those which are more popular (and well-connected) globally, until a node
within the same community as the destination is found. Then the commu-
nities represent groups of nodes which are likely to encounter one another
frequently, and so the message should only be forwarded within the commu-
nity until it reaches its destination.
SimBetTS [47] SimBetTS also uses DSNs, in a similar approach to Bubble Rap.
Further metrics from social network analysis are employed, namely between-
ness centrality and social similarity.
The betweenness centrality of a node is similar to the centrality used in Bub-
ble Rap; it is a measure for how well-connected each node is within the net-
work. The social similarity of two nodes is their number of common neigh-
bours, i.e., the number of one-hop neighbouring nodes that they have in com-
mon.
These social network analysis metrics are used to dynamically calculate a
utility value for each message during each encounter. The message is for-
warded if the utility of the encountered node is higher than the current node.
The intuition is that messages are likely to first be routed towards more cen-
tral nodes, and then towards more similar nodes — this is similar to Bubble
Rap, although social similarity is used in place of detected communities.
Habit [99] Habit combines usage of a DSN of frequently-encountered nodes (termed
a “regularity graph”) with a SRSN recording who is interested in receiving
content from whom (termed an “interest graph”), to create an information-
dissemination system. Nodes exchange local views of both social networks
during encounters, such that each node maintains views of both graphs.
Messages are then source routed, with senders finding paths through the reg-
ularity graph that minimise overhead in the interest graph — i.e., minimise
the number of nodes on the interest graph that are used for routing informa-
tion which they are not also interested in receiving in their own right. Dur-
ing encounters, messages are forwarded according to the previously-chosen
route.
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Friendlist-based Social Forwarding [128] Friendlist-based Social Forwarding (FSF)
utilises both DSNs derived from encounters and SRSNs from Facebook friend-
ships for routing.
During each encounter, nodes exchange social network information. Simi-
larly to SimBetTS, a utility value is dynamically calculated for each message
— but in FSF this utility is based on combining two forms of social network
information with equal weights: DSN node centrality and SRSN tie strength.
The message is forwarded if the utility of the encountered node is higher than
that of the current node.
PeopleRank [104] PeopleRank uses an SRSN of reported social ties between nodes,
to determine the “importance” of each node within the social network. By
analogy to Google’s PageRank algorithm [27], nodes are ranked as “impor-
tant” when they are socially linked to many other “important” nodes.
During encounters, messages are only forwarded if the encountered node
has a higher PeopleRank rank than the current node. The intuition is that
more socially well-connected nodes are better to use for forwarding.
SRSN Routing [20] SRSN Routing (SRSNR) uses SRSNs for a form of source rout-
ing. Senders include, with each message, a list of nodes which may be suit-
able for use in routing — the “friends” of the source node.
During each encounter, a given message is forwarded to the encountered
node only if that node is on the list of candidate forwarding nodes specified
by the source node, alongside the message. This forwarding occurs even if
the two nodes are not themselves friends with one another.
The intuition is that encounters between the source node’s friends are more
likely than encounters between random nodes. For example, co-workers
within the same building may both be friends of the source node, even if not
necessarily each other, but may regularly encounter one another in hallways
at work.
Table 2.1 summarises these six social network routing schemes, categorising each
by the type of social network used. In this thesis our focus when discussing social
network routing is primarily SRSN Routing (SRSNR), where SRSNs are used for
source routing.
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SNR protocol Uses DSNs Uses SRSNs
Bubble Rap [75] Yes No
SimBetTS [47] Yes No
Habit [99] Yes Yes
Friendlist-based Social Forwarding [128] Yes Yes
PeopleRank [104] No Yes
SRSN Routing [20] No Yes
Table 2.1: Social network type(s) used within social network routing schemes.
2.3 Security and privacy problems
Opportunistic networks are fundamentally decentralised, relying on participation
by nodes in the network to forward and route messages for one another. But if all
nodes are expected to act as routers, and some nodes may be untrusted, a variety
of possible threats are introduced that may not exist in a traditional infrastructure
network. Such threats may relate to the security of the network, or to the privacy
of the users of the network.
We outline examples of some of the high-level security and privacy threats in
this section. Mitigating these threats is a key area of opportunistic networking
research [42], which we discuss further in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 Privacy
Potentially-private information which might be disclosed, or potentially be inferred,
through participation in an opportunistic network includes:
Payload confidentiality Message contents may be disclosed, enabling messages
to be read by unintended parties. This threat may be mitigated with encryp-
tion, if the sender and destination are able to agree on encryption keys [127].
Communication patterns Messages may be traced as they progress through the
opportunistic network, allowing an attacker to infer communication patterns [92].
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The attacker need not necessarily be able to read the plaintext message con-
tent in order to perform this attack: eavesdropping on multiple encounters,
and being able to detect that the same message was transmitted during each
encounter (e.g., with transmission of the same encrypted text, or through
matching headers), would be sufficient.
Anonymity Whether a particular person is participating in an opportunistic net-
work — and if so the link between their network identity and their real-life
identity — may itself be considered private information. Anonymity is also
linked to communication patterns: determination of the real-life identity of a
pair of communicating nodes is a related privacy threat.
Location privacy Locations of the participants may be inferred from the messages
which their mobile devices carry — whether in absolute terms (“Alice is
at the supermarket”), or relative terms of co-location (“Alice and Bob were
in the same location this afternoon”). This threatens location privacy, i.e.,
“the ability to prevent other parties from learning one’s current or past loca-
tion” [16]. Since messages are exchanged only when participants are in phys-
ical proximity, threats to the privacy of communication patterns (e.g., eaves-
dropping on messages progressing through the network) can enable infer-
ence attacks against location privacy (see Chapter 4.2).
Social graph privacy Social network information is utilised by social network rout-
ing protocols (see Chapter 2.2.3). This information may be leaked via the
routing scheme, if the routing scheme shares such information with other
nodes during routing. Social ties between users, and more generally the
social graph, may be considered sensitive information, however [70, 89]. In
routing schemes such as SRSN Routing, since social links are directly used
to inform routing decisions, social graph privacy is additionally linked to
communication patterns and location privacy: eavesdropping messages pro-
gressing through the network can allow inferences to be made about both
(co-)location and social ties. We discuss this further in Chapter 4.2.
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2.3.2 Security
Malicious nodes within opportunistic networks may perform attacks, which may
significantly reduce the performance or availability of the network [37].
We note that many of these same high-level attacks are also possible in MANETs,
since the basic idea behind each attack is a misbehaving node [30].
A non-exhaustive sample of attacks to which opportunistic networks are suscepti-
ble includes:
Black hole [49] A malicious node may discard any message which it has accepted,
without forwarding the message in accordance with the routing protocol.
Opportunistic networks have a natural resilience to this attack, if using a
replica-based routing protocol: since multiple copies of the message would
typically exist in the network, a malicious node discarding one copy may
have a more limited impact than in other network types.
Sybil [51] A Sybil Attack consists of forging multiple identities. Without a cen-
tralised authority to certify identity, a single malicious node may be able
to spoof arbitrarily many identities within the network. For example, if an
opportunistic network consisted of nodes identified solely by MAC address,
then a single malicious node could appear to be any arbitrarily-high number
of other nodes over time, by spoofing many MAC addresses.
This attack may undermine redundancy — for example, if a limited number
of copies of the message are to be spread into the network, then a malicious
node could accept all copies under different identities and then perform a
black hole-style attack. Reputation-based approach may also be affected,
since a Sybil node may assume other identities to falsely “vouch for” itself,
or may bypass a blacklist-based system by changing to use a new identity
once flagged.
Routing information falsification [30] If nodes in a network are expected to exchange
routing information with one another, then a malicious node may falsify the
information it supplies to any encountered node. For example, some of the
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social network routing protocols discussed in Section 2.2.3 involve exchang-
ing social network information. This may impact routing performance, by
distorting the other node’s view of the network. This may also be combined
with the Sybil attack, to spoof information about multiple false identities.
Flooding [144] A malicious node may flood the network with messages. If the
identity of the node can be spoofed (as in the Sybil attack described previ-
ously), then this flooding may be untraceable. As the available resources of
participating devices (e.g., battery) are finite, and may be drained by receiv-
ing and retransmitting these messages, this flooding attack may therefore act
as a denial-of-service attack against participating network nodes.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the evolution of opportunistic networks, from
previous wireless network research. We have noted the following points:
• Opportunistic networks are an evolution of previous wireless networks, to
enable networking in disconnected networks, i.e., even where no end-to-end
path necessarily ever exists between source and destination.
• To avoid flooding the network, routing protocols have been developed that,
in the absence of global knowledge at each node, utilise social network infor-
mation.
• Simulation is the primary method used to evaluate routing protocol perfor-
mance.
• Opportunistic networks using such routing protocols have inherent privacy
and security threats for participants.
In the next chapter, we discuss the current research being performed to address
these problems.
Chapter 3
Privacy and security in opportunistic
networks
In this chapter, we survey current research on opportunistic networks, with a
focus on privacy and security. We begin by discussing the accuracy and credibili-
ty of opportunistic network simulation under assumptions about potential users’
real-world behaviour, including privacy-preserving behaviours. We then examine
existing proposed methods to preserve users’ privacy in opportunistic networks.
Finally, we consider defences against security attacks to the availability of oppor-
tunistic networks.
3.1 Simulation
We noted in Chapter 2 that there do not currently exist real-world large-scale
opportunistic network deployments. It is also often impractical to create a deploy-
ment for experimental purposes — both in general on a large-scale, and even
on a smaller scale when constant refinement and development of protocols are
required. Performance evaluation is therefore primarily achieved through simula-
tion. How accurate, or credible, are these simulations?
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Network type Nodes are mobile Is delay-tolerant
Mesh network No No
Wireless sensor network No Yes
VANET Yes (vehicles) Yes
MANET Yes (people) No
Opportunistic network Yes (people) Yes
Table 3.1: Wireless network properties compared and contrasted (as referenced
throughout this thesis).
3.1.1 Simulating the network
Simulation has been widely used as a tool for network research in general, beyond
only opportunistic networks, to aid development of new types of network and pro-
tocols. Many researchers have therefore investigated the problem of how to create
credible network simulations across a wide variety of network types — including
traditional infrastructure networks such as the Internet [58] and telecommunica-
tions networks [112], as well as wireless networks more closely related to oppor-
tunistic networks such as mesh networks [136], wireless sensor networks [62],
VANETs [24] and MANETs [4]. (As a note on terminology, there is not univer-
sal agreement in the research literature about delineations between these wireless
network types; for clarity, Table 3.1 compares and contrasts the properties of such
networks as referenced within this thesis.)
Challenges for credible network simulation have been widely noted. For example,
in a seminal paper Pawlikowski et al. survey over 2,200 publications containing
telecommunications network simulation studies, and note a “crisis of credibili-
ty” [112]. More recently, Kurkowski et al. [91] and Hiranandani et al. [71] survey
MANET MobiHoc publications, for 2000–2005 and 2006–2010 respectively. Both
surveys find that many simulations described are not credible, or not repeatable.
Joerer et al. [79] report a similar finding for VANET simulations.
To improve the situation, and produce more credible network simulations, vari-
ous guidelines and best practices have been proposed. For example, Pawlikows-
ki et al. focus on two necessary conditions for a credible simulation study: “appro-
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priate pseudo-random generators . . . and appropriate analysis of simulation out-
put data” [112]. Andel and Yasinsac [4] survey MANET simulation credibility, and
also provide general recommendations — including to document all simulation
settings to allow repeatability, to perform an appropriate number of independent
runs, and where possible to validate simulations against a real-world implementa-
tion. Perrone and Ward [116] have introduced a framework (“SAFE”) to aid auto-
mated application of such general simulation best practices.
In addition to general simulation guidelines, improving wireless network simula-
tion credibility in particular is also well-researched. Measurement-based compar-
isons between simulations and testbeds have been made for networks as diverse
as wireless mesh networks [136], wireless sensor networks [62] and MANETs [142].
Physical-layer wireless assumptions have also been considered. For example, New-
port et al. [106] and Anderson et al. [5] experimentally test physical-layer assump-
tions often used in wireless simulations. These assumptions include fixed-distance
circular transmission range (two nodes can communicate with one another if and
only if they are within a set distance of one another), and symmetry (if node A can
successfully transmit to node B, then node B can successfully transmit a reply back
to node A). They demonstrate that these assumptions may not hold, which may
impact results of simulations making these assumptions.
As a subtype of wireless networks, these well-studied network-layer issues are
also applicable to opportunistic network simulation. For example, Bittencourt et
al. discuss a virtualisation-based software testbed for more accurately simulating
wireless channel characteristics in opportunistic network simulation [22]. But an
additional consideration for credible simulation of opportunistic networks is sim-
ulating the network users.
3.1.2 Simulating users
In infrastructureless networks — including opportunistic networks, MANETs and
VANETs — the network is formed by mobile nodes carried by network users. This
means that the network performance is dependent on the behaviour of the users,
and thus user behaviour must be considered as a factor in creating credible net-
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work simulations.
The most well-studied facet of user behaviour in the context of credible network
simulations is mobility. Messages can be exchanged only when nodes are in phys-
ical proximity to one another, and so network performance strongly depends on
user movements [35, 86, 33]. A variety of approaches for simulating mobility have
been proposed, which can be grouped into two broad categories: purely synthetic,
or based on empirical observations.
A commonly-used example of a purely synthetic mobility model is the Random
Waypoint Mobility Model [81, 71], where nodes travel between random locations,
pausing upon arriving at each new destination. A danger, however, with such
purely synthetic models is that movements may be unrealistic, leading to poten-
tially unreliable network performance simulation results [148, 76]. The alterna-
tive is to base node movements on empirical observations. One approach, used
for example by Schwamborn et al. [124], is to construct a more realistic mobili-
ty model based on empirical data. Another approach, used by Kim et al. [88],
is to use real mobility traces to drive simulations on an emulated testbed. A
third approach, used widely in opportunistic network simulations, is to perform
contact-driven simulation: traces of encounters between devices (also known as
“contact traces”) may be used to simulate message-passing routing protocols real-
istically, since knowing encounters (even if lacking full mobility data) are sufficient
for such simulations [130, 134, 10].
In addition to mobility, other factors too may also affect the credibility of oppor-
tunistic network simulations. Ristanovic et al. compare opportunistic network per-
formance of a real testbed to trace-driven simulation, and note that assumptions
such as infinite buffers for storing messages may affect simulation performance
results [120]. Mota et al. also note that assumptions made for traffic patterns may
not match real opportunistic network applications [103]. Where social network
information is used for routing, a further factor to consider is the realism of the
social network itself; Orman and Labatut, for example, study the impact of social
network realism on community detection algorithms [108].
Another type of user behaviour that may affect opportunistic network perfor-
mance is privacy-preserving behaviour. Participating in an opportunistic network
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may expose users to privacy threats, as detailed in Chapter 2.3.1. Due to these
threats, users may become less willing to participate in message forwarding on
behalf of other users [101]: during times when the opportunistic network applica-
tion is not running on their devices, a given user’s exposure to privacy threats is
minimised, since the user is effectively invisible to the network.
To create a credible opportunistic network simulation, we may therefore need to
consider how to measure and model such privacy-preserving user behaviour, and
its corresponding impact on the performance of the network. We highlight this as
a gap not addressed in current opportunistic network simulation research.
3.2 Privacy attack defences
As we have discussed previously in Chapters 2.3.1 and 3.1, users of a naı¨ve oppor-
tunistic network may be exposed to privacy threats, which can cause them con-
cern [101]. In this section, we outline current research related to adapting oppor-
tunistic networks to preserve users’ privacy.
We consider methods proposed to protect each of the categories of potentially-
private information that were identified in Chapter 2.3.1: payload confidentiality,
communication patterns, anonymity, location privacy, and social graph privacy.
3.2.1 Payload confidentiality
As in other networks, one approach to protect the confidentiality of message pay-
loads is by employing encryption. Traditional approaches to key distribution and
key management, however, are difficult to apply to opportunistic networks. Due
to the disconnected nature of the network, with delays inherent to opportunistic
network message delivery, querying a public key infrastructure (PKI) is likely to be
impractical [55, 85], and even much of the research on key distribution in MANETs
does not generalise to disconnected opportunistic networks [25].
A possible exception — noted as potentially being suitable for disconnected net-
works such as opportunistic networks [125, 8, 127, 85] — is in the use of identity-
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based cryptography (IBC) [26]. In IBC, node identifiers serve as their public keys.
Private keys are obtained by each node from a globally-trusted third party, the
“private key generator” (PKG). This key generation step need only be performed
once; after initially obtaining this private key from the PKG, a node need not be
able to communicate again with the PKG while participating in the opportunistic
network. IBC has two main drawbacks, however, in that a globally-trusted third
party is required, and forward secrecy is lacking (i.e., a stolen private key allows
decryption of all prior communication with that key). Seth and Keshav [125] par-
tially address these problems, by describing a time-based and hierarchical IBC
scheme, with a hierarchy of PKGs descending from a root PKG. But even this solu-
tion requires a globally-trusted third party, which may be a limiting requirement
for general opportunistic networks.
An alternative approach to ensure payload confidentiality is by routing oppor-
tunistic network messages via trusted social contacts. For example, Bulut and Szy-
manski [29] describe a two-period routing protocol: although messages are unen-
crypted, routing is preferentially via trusted friends where possible, to reduce the
risk of an untrusted node receiving the unencrypted payload. El Defrawy et al. [55]
describe a routing protocol where messages are sent encrypted via social contacts,
under the assumption that social contacts know one another’s encryption keys.
Summarising, if sender and receiver are able to agree on encryption keys — which
may be challenging in an opportunistic network — then encryption may be used
to preserve message confidentiality. We note this privacy threat primarily for com-
pleteness; our focus is on eavesdropping, metadata privacy, and inference attacks.
3.2.2 Communication patterns and anonymity
Traffic analysis may reveal communication patterns — for example, determination
of those nodes participating in the opportunistic network, or with which other
people users communicate (sender-receiver linkability). Onion routing [64] is a
popular proposed solution [92, 126, 78, 1]. The idea behind onion routing is to mix
and route messages via intermediate nodes, with successive layers of encryption
“peeled away” at each hop, in order to provide anonymity. Tor is the most widely-
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known implementation of onion routing on the traditional Internet.
In contrast to traditional onion routing implementations, where messages are rout-
ed along a fixed path of intermediate nodes, adaptations of onion routing for
opportunistic networks — such as PEON by Le et al. [92] and ARDEN by Shi et
al. [126] — often generalise onion routing to allow messages to be forwarded by
intermediate groups of nodes, rather than fixed intermediate nodes. This provides
more flexibility for routing, since requiring a message to be sent along a single fixed
path would be a strong requirement for an opportunistic network. Such approach-
es, however, require that encryption keys for nodes, or groups of nodes, are known
by the original message source.
Alternative methods for preserving privacy of communication patterns have also
been proposed. To provide authentication along with source anonymity, Ahmad
et al. describe using source pseudonyms with blind signatures [2]. This approach
relies on a globally-trusted certificate authority, however, to sign pseudonymised
certificates. Kate et al. [85] in the context of opportunistic networks, and Lu et
al. [97] for VANETs, suggest using special trusted static nodes, which they respec-
tively term “DTN Gateways” or “Roadside Units”. In each case, senders first pass
their message to the trusted node, which is trusted to know their identity. Then
this node forwards the message (along with other messages similarly collected)
to the network. This assumes, however, the presence of these fully-trusted static
nodes.
Solutions that can be implemented locally at nodes, without requiring encryption
or globally-trusted third parties, have also been suggested. In the context of an
opportunistic publish-subscribe application, Do¨ra and Holczer [50] demonstrate
a method to perturb user profiles, to avoid traffic analysis revealing a user’s spe-
cific interests. Or for more traditional opportunistic network routing, Radenkovic
et al. [118] propose AdaptAnon, an anonymisation overlay on top of opportunis-
tic network social network routing, where local heuristics are used to build on-
demand “anonymisation paths” for messages through the opportunistic network.
Summarising, unless special care (such as onion routing) is taken to preserve anonymi-
ty of communication patterns, traffic analysis may reveal movement of messages
throughout the network. We discuss the implications further in Chapter 4.2.
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3.2.3 Location privacy
Users may not wish their physical locations to be public knowledge [16, 28, 40, 15,
6, 61]. Participating in an opportunistic network exposes users to location priva-
cy threats. For example, Ristanovic et al. describe how location patterns can be
recovered by analysing node encounters (such as those which would be detected
through using an opportunistic network), if some malicious nodes are logging GPS
locations [121]. But while techniques to preserve location privacy are well-studied
in other contexts — such as protocols in sensor networks [83] and MANETs [56],
or by cloaking or obfuscating specific locations when using services explicitly ded-
icated to publishing sensed locations [146, 48, 90, 7] — preserving location privacy
is a relatively new research topic in networks such as opportunistic networks.
To address the location privacy threats, Lu et al. introduce ALAR, an opportunis-
tic network routing protocol designed to be resistant to localisation attacks [98].
The technique is based on splitting each message into multiple segments, and then
sending each segment encrypted via multiple paths. The decryption key is includ-
ed with one of the segments, sidestepping the key distribution problems described
in previous sections. This, however, degrades routing performance, because the
message cannot be read until the receiver has received multiple segments — which
is less likely than receiving a single message.
A second, alternative approach is taken in three similar opportunistic network
routing protocols, all introduced by Zakhary et al.: HSLPO [152], SLPD [151], and
LPAF [153]. Each protocol relies on forwarding messages in two phases: an initial
obfuscation phase where only trusted social contacts are utilised for forwarding,
followed by a second free-forwarding phase where a non-privacy-aware routing
protocol may be used. The intention is that no untrusted node (i.e., not a trusted
social contact) will receive the message until it has spread sufficiently-far from the
original sender to provide this sender location privacy.
Location privacy is a relatively new research topic for opportunistic networks.
Eavesdropping can, however, unless countermeasures are taken, allow inferences
to be made about location or co-location. We return to this point in Chapter 4.2,
and focus on examining users’ attitudes to location privacy throughout Chapter 4.
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3.2.4 Social graph privacy
The final type of potentially-private information that we consider is the social
graph, where nodes are opportunistic network users and edges are social links.
Such graphs are, as described in Chapter 2, useful for social network routing. The
structure of a social network graph may in itself be private information [105, 100].
To demonstrate this, Narayanan and Shmatikov show that it can be possible to link
two distinct social networks based on network topology alone, and that this may
therefore allow deanonymisation of nodes by comparison of an “anonymised”
social network to another available social network dataset [105].
Focusing on one aspect of social graph privacy — preserving the privacy of the
probability that a given node will encounter a particular other node, which may
correlated with social relationships — Hasan et al. introduce the 3PR routing proto-
col [69]. Nodes are organised into communities, and within communities messages
are forwarded using epidemic-style forwarding. Between communities, privacy is
preserved by exchanging community-level encounter probability information only
— rather than an individual node’s probability information — in an otherwise
PRoPHET-style routing decision. 3PR relies on the assumption that nodes can be
grouped into communities, however, and also does not consider social network
routing, where social network information explicitly drives routing decisions.
Approaching the problem from the other direction, researchers have considered
how to find social relations in opportunistic networking scenarios without com-
promising privacy. Guo et al. [65] introduce PSaD, a privacy-preserving scheme to
disseminate content to social relations — where social relations are defined in this
context as users with similar attributes. Similarly, Costantino et al. [44] describe the
privacy vs accuracy trade-off in interest-casting, where the goal is to find “friends”
— which they define as users with similar interests — in a privacy-preserving man-
ner. Both schemes, however, define social contacts as users interested in receiving
similar content. They do not consider general opportunistic network routing, and
specifically social network routing — where pre-existing friendship links may be
used to drive routing decisions.
As described in Chapter 2.2.3, potentially-sensitive social network information
may be used within opportunistic network social network routing protocols to
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enable performant routing. Privacy issues are, however, typically not consid-
ered. Even for the one social network routing protocol that we are aware of where
privacy-preserving schemes are discussed — the HiBOp scheme introduced by
Boldrini et al. [25] — performance evaluation is conducted in the absence of the
privacy-preserving features. We therefore highlight a gap in current opportunis-
tic networking research: whether social network information can be used for social
networking routing in a privacy-preserving manner, without diminishing network
performance. We focus on examining this open research topic within Chapter 5.
3.3 Security attack defences
Malicious nodes within opportunistic networks may perform attacks [36], a sam-
ple of which we have previously enumerated in Chapter 2.3.2: black hole [49],
Sybil [51], routing information falsification [30], and denial-of-service (DoS) via
flooding [144]. While opportunistic networks have an inherent degree of resilience
to some attacks [30], such as the black hole attack, they are not necessarily infalli-
ble; attacks have been demonstrated to impact network performance [37].
Defences to these attacks have been well-studied for always-connected networks,
such as MANETs, but often do not generalise to networks that are expected to
exhibit frequent (if not permanent) disconnectivity, such as opportunistic networks.1
For example, Deng et al. describe a modification to the MANET AODV routing
protocol to provide resilience to black hole attacks, by sending test data upon
route establishment prior to using the route [49] — but opportunistic network rout-
ing protocols do not establish fixed routes, and so cannot use this method. Other
examples of protocols that similarly depend on always-connected networks, and
thus are not suited for the generalised case of typically-disconnected opportunis-
tic networks, include the MANET secure route discovery protocol proposed by
Papadimitratos and Haas [109] (which again requires fixed routes), and, for flood-
1In special cases, an opportunistic network may exhibit periods of high connectivity — for exam-
ple, if a crowd of people are for a short time in a densely-packed small area, such as a full stadium.
But in the general case, opportunistic networks are expected to experience frequent disconnectivity,
and therefore opportunistic network protocols are necessarily designed to function in disconnected
scenarios.
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ing attacks, the MANET Flooding Attack Prevention scheme introduced by Yi et
al. [147] (which relies on deprioritising route establishment during busy periods
and deleting existing routes that are being used to flood). Outside of MANETs,
Yu et al. describe SybilGuard [149], a method to detect the Sybil attack via social
network analysis to detect abnormality — but which again relies on a connected
network, and so is not suitable for opportunistic networks.
Other defence schemes may not be inherently inapplicable for opportunistic net-
works, but in practice are not suitable. Kim and Helmy describe CATCH, a cross-
layer MANET framework for traceback [87], i.e., a method to determine the source
of malicious traffic in order to allow it to be blocked. The detection mechanisms
proposed rely on nodes near to the attacker being able to detect abnormal traffic
— an assumption that is likely to hold for MANETs, where nodes are typically in
close proximity at all times, but not for opportunistic networks, where encounters
are more sporadic. Some other examples include the MANET flow-based flooding
detection proposed by Guo et al. [66] (since traffic flows are typically bursty for
opportunistic networks, i.e., only during encounters), and the Sybil detection pro-
posed by Piro et al. [117] (since the method relies on repeatedly overhearing traffic
from other nodes).
More broadly, some proposed security schemes — even those proposed in the con-
text of opportunistic networks — rely on assumptions that may not hold in oppor-
tunistic networks. For example, in Chapter 3.2, we noted that the assumption of a
PKI or globally-trusted third party is potentially unrealistic for opportunistic net-
works. Li et al. propose a scheme to detect and mitigate opportunistic network
black hole attacks, using signed encounter tickets to provide evidence of encoun-
ters [94], but the scheme relies on this assumption. A second such strong assump-
tion, as previously discussed, is requiring the existence of globally-trusted nodes.
Examples of schemes making this assumption include SPRING introduced by Lu et
al. [97] and FBIDM by Chuah et al. [38]; these schemes allow detection of black hole
attacks by requiring the existence of static globally-trusted VANET nodes (“Road-
side Units”) or mobile globally-trusted opportunistic nodes (“ferries”) respective-
ly.
We see that there is a need to develop schemes to defend against security threats to
opportunistic networks, without requiring such assumptions. This is an ongoing
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research area, although some such schemes have been proposed.
For example, consider black hole attacks. Uddin et al. introduce SPREAD [140],
a scheme where opportunistic network nodes increase the number of copies sent
upon locally detecting evidence that messages are not being delivered by other
nodes within the network. Al-Hinai et al. describe TB-SnW (Trust-based Spray-
and-Wait) [3], an opportunistic network routing protocol designed to be resilient
to black hole attacks by nodes locally maintaining “trust” values for other encoun-
tered nodes — providing greater trust to nodes which have historically participat-
ed in exchanging messages. Zakhary and Radenkovic show that erasure coding —
a type of networking coding where the original sender splits messages into mul-
tiple parts, which are sent independently, and not all of which need arrive at the
destination for successful message delivery — can also help to mitigate black hole
attacks [150].
More generally, Trifunovic et al. consider trust in opportunistic networks — both
in the context of detecting Sybil nodes [139] and detecting unwanted spam mes-
sages [138]. In [139], Sybil nodes are detected by a scheme where nodes exchange
lists of their friends — trusted social contacts — during encounters. Each node is
then able to locally construct a view of the whole social graph, and assigns greater
trust to closer nodes (e.g., friends-of-friends). This scheme does not address priva-
cy, however; we noted in Chapter 2.3.1 that the social graph is potentially sensitive,
and so it may be undesirable to share friendship information publicly. In [138],
trust values are assigned to all other encountered nodes in the network. Users
are required to explicitly classify messages received as either spam or legitimate
content — although classifications are shared between nodes, to avoid every node
having to classify every message. This scheme is therefore not usable for message
delivery in networks where message payload is considered sensitive: intermediate
forwarding nodes cannot classify a message as spam or legitimate without reading
the plaintext message contents.
Summarising, Table 3.2 categorises this sample of defences to the security threats
noted in Chapter 2.3.2, dividing research between MANETs and opportunistic net-
works. We note from this a research gap: automatic detection and mitigation
of flooding attacks in opportunistic networks has not been addressed, except by
schemes requiring strong assumptions such as a globally-trusted third party. The
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MANET defence Opportunistic network defence
Black hole [49] [3, 38, 94, 97, 140, 150]
Sybil [117, 149] [139]
Routing information falsification [109] N/A (no routes to falsify)
Flooding [66, 87, 147] -
Table 3.2: Research to address security threats in MANETs and opportunistic net-
works.
closest related work is the PRED queueing policy introduced by Lee et al. [93].
PRED is a buffer queueing policy for probabilistic opportunistic network routing
protocols (e.g., PRoPHET). PRED attempts to deprioritise storage of flood mes-
sages, to ensure that legitimate messages displace flood messages in full buffers.
While this may help to avoid legitimate messages being dropped due to full buffers,
such a queueing scheme does not fully mitigate the flooding attack: other costs to
nodes are still incurred by the attack, such as energy loss.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have outlined the current state-of-the-art opportunistic net-
working security and privacy research. We have noted the following points, and
three open questions:
• Research has focused on routing protocol performance in opportunistic net-
works, primarily evaluated through simulation. An open question is whether
performance may be impacted by users reducing their participation in the
network due to privacy concerns.
• Potentially-sensitive social network information may be used within rout-
ing protocols, to enable performant routing. An open question is whether
the social network information may be used in a privacy-preserving manner,
while maintaining routing performance.
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• Existing proposed schemes to mitigate security threats often rely on strong
assumptions which may not hold across many opportunistic network deploy-
ments — for example, the presence of a globally-trusted third party. An open
question is how to mitigate threats such as denial-of-service flooding attacks
while relaxing these assumptions.
We examine each of the three open questions noted above in turn, one each per
chapter in Chapters 4–6. In the next chapter, we therefore consider the first of these
open questions: if users reduce their participation in opportunistic networks due
to their privacy concerns, then might this impact the performance of the network?
Chapter 4
Exploring the performance impact of
users’ privacy preferences
4.1 Introduction
We have noted in Chapter 2.3.1 that participating in an opportunistic network can
expose users to privacy threats, and in Chapter 3.1 that users may become less wil-
ing to forward messages on behalf of other users because exposure to the privacy
threats is minimised during times when the opportunistic network application is
not running. We have also noted the research gap, where opportunistic network
performance simulations have not considered how to measure and model such
privacy-preserving user behaviour, and its corresponding impact on network per-
formance.
To simulate network performance taking account of this privacy-preserving behaviour,
we require a model of the users’ privacy-preserving behaviour. By analogy to user
mobility models, as we have seen in Chapter 3.1.2, one way to obtain such a mod-
el is to create a synthetic model generated according to mathematical properties.
Synthetic models, as we have seen, are useful for simulation since they are easy
to generate, but may have limitations in how accurately they represent real user
behaviour.
An alternative is to build an empirical privacy model, based on measurements of
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users’ behaviour, to then apply to opportunistic network performance simulations.
But a new question then arises: if we perform a user study using a simulated
application, would the privacy preferences recorded match that when using a real
application? Might this affect the empirical privacy models obtained from such an
experiment, and therefore the opportunistic network performance results?
The contributions of this chapter are:
• We apply a synthetic privacy model to opportunistic network performance
simulations, and demonstrate that a large performance impact can result.
• We construct an empirical privacy model based on actual measurements of
people. Applying the empirical privacy model to opportunistic network sim-
ulations, we demonstrate that it may be possible to use simulated applica-
tions as a substitute for real applications when measuring privacy prefer-
ences. We also demonstrate that users’ privacy preferences can have a large
impact on network performance.
4.2 Attack model
In Chapter 2.3.1, we discussed examples of privacy threats to which opportunistic
network users may be exposed. We consider first how an attacker could perform
attacks.
We consider an attacker with certain, limited capabilities. From the attacker mod-
els enumerated in [92] against opportunistic networks, our interest is in the local
eavesdropper (an attacker who can eavesdrop in the vicinity of a user), and the par-
tial eavesdropper (an attacker who can place receivers in a number of hotspots and
intercept traffic in the vicinity). We agree that a global eavesdropper is not a practical
attack model in an opportunistic network — by the very nature of such a network,
nodes are distributed over a very large area, and traffic is not routed through any
central hub. Therefore we do not consider attacks which would require global
knowledge, such as an attacker studying overall network traffic patterns. We enu-
merate attacks based on intercepting some number of messages.
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We choose to employ attack trees, as introduced by Schneier [122]. An attack tree
is a type of and-or tree, used to enumerate attacks against a system. The root node
of the tree is the overall attack goal, while nodes within the tree are subgoals. The
children of a particular node are the steps required to achieve that node’s subgoal.
By constructing such a tree from the root node (overall goal) downwards, we now
enumerate a structured threat analysis for attacks against an opportunistic net-
work using social network routing. We select the following goals as “low-hanging
fruit” for an attacker intent on compromising privacy of opportunistic network
users.
Goal 1: Discover structural information about the social network graph. (Threat
to social graph privacy.)
1. Learn whether a friendship link exists (or does not exist) between two users.
OR
(a) Discover communication (or lack of) between the users. OR
i. Eavesdrop a message as it is forwarded user-to-user, from source to
final destination (or any intermediary). OR
A. In social network routing protocols such as SRSN Routing (SRSNR),
a message traced along such a path reveals social network links
(or lack of) — because messages are forwarded if and only friend-
ship links exist. Friendship links are the path traversed by the
message.
ii. Extract source/destination from an intercepted message to an inter-
mediary.
(b) Extract friendship links from an intercepted message to an intermediary.
2. Learn how many friendship links a particular user has.
(a) Extract friendship links from an intercepted message to an intermediary.
Goal 2: Discover whether two individuals have been in proximity within a cer-
tain timeframe. (Threat to location privacy.)
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1. Follow one or both individuals for the time in question. OR
2. Infer proximity by sending a specially crafted message, and making infer-
ences based on where the message is observed within the network. OR
(a) Example: has Alice from New York recently met Bob from Los Ange-
les? To find out, an attacker Mallory in New York can inject a message
addressed for colluding attacker Trudy in Los Angeles into the system,
with Alice and Bob only as requested intermediaries. If Trudy receives
Mallory’s message, Mallory and Trudy have learned that Alice and Bob
have met within the lifetime of this malicious message.
3. Infer proximity by noting that messages are not forwarded twice. OR
(a) Example: if a message is not forwarded to a node known to be a request-
ed intermediary, the message must already have been forwarded earlier.
An attacker can infer that the nodes were in proximity before this time.
This is a passive version of 2, not requiring message injection.
4. Wait in a common place and listen for message traffic. Message exchange, or
message headers, may reveal the colocation of individuals to an attacker.
Goal 3: De-anonymise a social network to discover the presence of individuals
within the network. (Threat to anonymity.)
1. Follow individuals, and tie their network identifiers to their actual identities.
OR
2. Infer identities from known portions of the social network.
(a) Example: if five people are known to be mutual friends, and four are
deanonymised with a fifth mysterious node, an attacker can infer that
this unknown node is the last member of the clique.
For each of these privacy threats, an opportunistic network user can mitigate the
risk by reducing their participation in the network. How would this privacy-
preserving user behaviour affect opportunistic network performance?
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4.3 Performance evaluation: synthetic privacy model
We first consider simulation privacy-preserving user behaviour using a synthet-
ic privacy model. As previously noted in Chapter 3.1.2, synthetic models are
already widely used in opportunistic network research in the context of mobili-
ty. In this section, we extend the SRSN Routing (SRSNR) protocol as discussed in
Chapter 2.2.3 with a simple synthetic privacy model.
In SRSNR, messages are forwarded between the social contacts (“friends”) of the
original message sender, during encounters when they are in physical proximi-
ty. We introduce a synthetic privacy model to this by assuming that nodes do
not always participate in exchanging messages during each encounter, but would
rather exchange messages during an encounter only with some fixed probability;
this probability is a parameter of the synthetic privacy model. For example, with
the probability parameter of 40%, in a given encounter two nodes would perform
SRSNR-style message exchange with one another with probability 40%, otherwise
no messages would be exchanged. Similarly, if the probability parameter was set
to 0%, this would imply that nodes cared so much about their privacy that they
refused to share data with any other nodes. The baseline behaviour of SRSNR in
the absence of a privacy model corresponds to a probability parameter of 100%.
To evaluate the performance of opportunistic networks employing this synthetic
privacy model with varying probability parameter, we use trace-driven simula-
tion.
4.3.1 Datasets
We use three real-world datasets to evaluate our routing schemes. While there are a
variety of available datasets including encounter and social-network information,
the three datasets used were chosen for their different scale and structure. All
datasets are publicly available.
1. The SASSY dataset [21]. In this dataset collected at St Andrews, 25 partici-
pants were equipped with 802.15.4 Tmote Invent sensors, and tracker for 79
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days. We use an augmented version of the trace, as detailed in Appendix A.1.1,
resulting in a dense trace of encounters between participants. Social network
information was obtained from Facebook friendships.
2. The Reality Mining dataset [53]. In this well-known dataset collected at MIT,
97 university members carried mobile phones during their daily lives over
the course of an academic year. The phones recorded the results of peri-
odic Bluetooth scans. We define Bluetooth encounters between participant
devices as opportunities for message exchange in an opportunistic network,
and use mobile phone address book contacts to determine social network
information.
3. The LocShare dataset [13]. As we will see later in this chapter, the LocShare
dataset was gathered for the primary purpose of obtaining an empirical pri-
vacy model. During the user study, however, we also collected location and
social network information, and therefore have a third dataset. We collected
the locations of 80 participants during four one-week runs of 20 participants.
By defining an encounter as occurring when two participants are within 10
metres — selected as this is the approximate average Bluetooth range — we
obtain a trace of encounters between participants. As for the SASSY dataset,
social network information was obtained from Facebook friendships.
Detailed descriptions of the datasets — including a comparison of their diverse
scale and structure — may be found in Appendix A.
4.3.2 Simulation parameters
We use the following set of parameters for the simulations:
• 100 runs per data point. Multiple runs were performed in order to allow
confidence intervals to be determined; 100 runs were chosen as the highest
order-of-magnitude to perform while remaining computationally tractable.
• Unicast messages, sent from a random sender node to a randomly-chosen
social network neighbour (friend) of this sender. Note that although messages
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are unicast (destined for one particular recipient), the messages may follow
multiple paths through the network in order to reach that destination. Note
also that this is a random traffic pattern, not based on real data; simulating a
real traffic pattern is considered out of scope for this thesis (see Chapter 7.3).
• 100 messages per run.
• A message time-to-live (TTL) of one day.
• One week per simulation.1
• Infinite buffers and infinitely-fast transmission.2
We consider probability parameters for the synthetic model from 0% to 100%, in
steps of 20%.
4.3.3 Results
Figures 4.1–4.3 show the performance of the network, as measured by two commonly-
used metrics [75]:
• Delivery ratio: proportion of delivered messages, out of the total number of
unique messages generated.
• Delivery delay: time taken for a message to first reach its destination.
Figure 4.1(a), Figure 4.2(a) and Figure 4.3(a) show that for each dataset, the net-
work performance as measured by delivery ratio strongly depends on the chosen
probability parameter. There is wide variation in performance, with performance
declining with decreasing probability of message exchange during each encounter.
1For LocShare, there are four one-week parts to the dataset; we therefore simulate 25 runs with
each of the four one-week parts to make up the 100 runs for each datapoint. For Reality Mining, we
pick a random one-week interval for each of the 100 runs — but we select only one-week intervals
where there are sufficient numbers of nodes present for non-trivial routing to be possible. For
SASSY, the augmented version of the trace is for a 30-day segment.
2Our goal is to investigate the performance impact of privacy, so we do not set arbitrary con-
straints on buffer size or transmission rate, as these may confound the results.
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Figure 4.1: SASSY dataset: Delivery ratio and delay under the synthetic priva-
cy model. Delivery ratio and delay vary widely based on the chosen probability
parameter.
For the SASSY dataset, Figure 4.1(b) shows a similar trend for delivery delay:
performance decreases (i.e., delivery delay increases) with decreasing probabili-
ty parameter. For the Reality Mining and LocShare datasets, however, Figure 4.2(b)
and Figure 4.3(b) show that delivery delay does not significantly change. In these
sparser datasets, any impact on delivery delay of changing the probability param-
eter is lost in the noise. We also note a paradoxical result for the LocShare dataset:
median delivery delay is low for the 20% probability parameter. This is a sur-
vivor effect: delivery delay calculations ignore messages which are not successful-
ly delivered, and so the successfully-delivered messages necessarily take shorter
paths to their destination, since message exchange is unlikely during each encounter.
While there is wide variation in network performance based on the probability
parameter, a limitation of the synthetic model is that there is no obvious way to
determine which probability parameter to use. Delivery performance depends on
the extent to which users reduce their participation in the network to preserve their
privacy. We therefore next consider how to construct an empirical privacy model.
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Figure 4.2: Reality Mining dataset: Delivery ratio and delay under the synthetic pri-
vacy model. Similarly to the SASSY dataset (Figure 4.1(a)), there is wide difference
in delivery ratio based on the chosen probability parameter. Delivery delay does
not significantly change, however; this may be an artifact of the sparse encounter
trace, since any successfully-delivered message will necessarily take approximate-
ly the same, small, number of hops.
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Figure 4.3: LocShare dataset: Delivery ratio and delay under the synthetic privacy
model. As for Figure 4.1(a) and Figure 4.2(a), delivery ratio varies widely based
on the chosen probability parameter. Paradoxically, delivery delay is reduced
when data are less likely to be exchanged during each encounter; successfully-
delivered messages necessarily take shorter paths to their destination, since mes-
sage exchange is unlikely during each encounter.
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4.4 Performance evaluation: empirical privacy model
4.4.1 Methodology
We performed a user study to investigate the location-sharing privacy preferences
of 80 users of the popular Facebook social networking site. By analogy to exist-
ing location-sharing applications, we introduce the assumption that privacy choic-
es for location-sharing behaviour when broadcasting locations via Facebook will
not be dissimilar to those for an opportunistic network participant, i.e., that users
would be willing to participate in an opportunistic network at times that they were
willing to share their location. We can therefore develop an empirical privacy mod-
el for opportunistic network usage based on the location-sharing privacy prefer-
ences measured in this study.
Participants in the LocShare experiment carried a location-sensing mobile phone
for one week of their day-to-day lives. Due to resource constraints — we had
20 mobile phones available, but 80 participants — the user study took place over
four one-week runs, each with 20 participants. Two runs each were performed
in a UK town (St Andrews) and a UK city (London). Participants were selected
from undergraduate students in both locations. We also selected only students
not studying Computer Science, so that they would not be known by us, and who
self-reported as daily Facebook users.
Following the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) [46, 41], participants were prompt-
ed in situ to answer questions relating to their location privacy preferences. Each
participant was prompted up to 20 times per day to choose how widely their cur-
rent location could be published on Facebook — to everyone, to some or all of their
Facebook social contacts (“friends”), or to nobody at all.
We asked participants to answer as many questions as possible, but we gave the
option of ignoring questions in order to avoid false responses. A total of 7,706
prompts were sent, which resulted in 4,232 replies (a 54.8% response rate). Indi-
vidual participant response rates ranged from 15.7% to 91.4%. Compensation was
not linked to response rate, which may be a factor in the response rate being lower
than in some other mobile ESM studies [40, 60]. The average response rate was 7.6
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Category Proportion in category
Location sharing choice
Nobody Friends Everyone
Open 18% (7/40) 5.2% 7.7% 87.1%
Social 45% (18/40) 9.7% 80.5% 9.7%
Closed 28% (11/40) 72.1% 20.3% 7.6%
Variable 10% (4/40) 33.3% 29.6% 37.2%
Table 4.1: Real group (n = 40). Rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
replies per participant per day.
In addition to measuring how widely participants were willing to share their cur-
rent locations, we had a secondary goal of investigating differences in privacy
behaviour between users of a real and a simulated application. During each run,
participants were therefore divided into two groups. Half of the participants (10/20)
were assigned at random to the real group, and half to the simulation group. Partic-
ipants in the real group had their locations published to Facebook, visible to their
social contacts according to their chosen preferences. Participants in the simula-
tion group were able to see on Facebook the information which would have been
published, but this was not disclosed to any of their social contacts.
We informed participants to which group they were assigned at the beginning
of each run. While we considered a blind experiment, where participants would
be unaware of their group, we explicitly told participants their group in order to
better match the scenario of the simulation group to prior simulation-only studies,
such as [40], where all participants used a simulated system, and were aware of
this fact throughout.
4.4.2 Model
We use the privacy preferences reported by real users during the user study to
obtain an empirical privacy model. To study the differences between simulated
and real applications, we construct separate models based on responses in the real
and simulation groups.
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Category Proportion in category
Location sharing choice
Nobody Friends Everyone
Open 20% (8/40) 10.0% 3.9% 86.1%
Social 53% (21/40) 5.8% 75.4% 18.8%
Closed 18% (7/40) 67.0% 20.5% 12.6%
Variable 10% (4/40) 32.2% 36.4% 31.4%
Table 4.2: Simulation group (n = 40). Rows may not add up to 100% due to
rounding.
As is common in other privacy models [143], we segment the participants of each
group into categories according to their privacy behaviour, i.e., their responses to
the prompted questions (see Tables 4.1–4.2). We define four categories:
• Open: Participants usually shared their location publicly with everyone, in
over 50% of responses.
• Social: Participants usually shared their location with some or all of their
Facebook friends, in over 50% of responses.
• Closed: Participants usually did not share their location to anybody at all, in
over 50% of responses.
• Variable: Participants did not have consistent location-sharing behaviour. They
would sometimes share with nobody, with friends, and with everyone.
Note that, to a certain extent, all of our users had “variable” behaviour in that they
did not act consistently at every location.3 Thus for the Open, Social and Closed
groups, we consider a participant to be a member of this group if their behaviour is
consistent with this group in over 50% of their sharing activity, i.e., their responses
to questions.
For each of the four categories, we calculate the mean of the users’ location sharing
choice proportions (nobody, friends or everyone) by user, in order to obtain Tables 4.1–
3Ben Abdesslem et al. explore the implications of this further in a position paper [12], arguing


























Figure 4.4: Proportion of participants in each category of the privacy model.
4.2. Using these statistics, we can construct privacy models for users’ location shar-
ing preferences, for each of the two groups of users. These privacy models are
dataset-independent, and so may be applied to a variety of datasets for oppor-
tunistic network routing simulations. While it may be possible to construct more
sophisticated models [137], our purpose here is to examine the differences in mod-
els between real and simulated applications, and so we limit ourselves to simple
statistical models for now.
Figure 4.4 shows a visualisation of the relative number of participants in each of the
four categories, for the real and simulation groups. The distribution of participants
across the categories is generally similar between the real and simulation groups.
As perhaps may be expected, most social network users were indeed social, and
willing to share with some or all of their Facebook friends. Smaller proportions
were either more open or closed than this, or acted in a variable fashion. Note,
however, that participants in the real group seemed more privacy-concerned than
those in the simulation group: more participants in the real group were assigned
to the privacy-concerned Closed category, and fewer to the less-privacy-concerned
Open and Social categories, than in the simulation group. This might also be expect-
ed; participants might have taken more care about sharing their information if they
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knew that information was actually being shared on Facebook, and so acted in a
more privacy-conscious, and perhaps more realistic, fashion.
We can now apply these privacy models for the two groups to opportunistic net-
work simulations, in order to examine to what extent these differences in privacy
behaviour affect routing performance.
4.4.3 Datasets and simulation parameters
To study the impact of simulated and real social networking applications on oppor-
tunistic network routing, we perform trace-driven simulations with the empiri-
cal privacy models, using the same datasets and simulation parameters as in Sec-
tion 4.3.
At the start of each simulation run, each node (i.e., simulated participant) is allo-
cated to one of the categories (open, social, closed, variable) for the duration of the
run. We perform simulation for three methods of category allocation:
• Central nodes closed: Similarly to [19], we make use of the finding that the
altruism (i.e., willingness to participate in message forwarding) of high-degree
nodes is most important for network performance [145], to highlight any per-
formance impact from the privacy models in our simulations. We rank nodes
from highest to lowest degree-centrality in the encounter graph, and assign
nodes in order to the closed, social, variable and open categories — with the
number of nodes in each category according to the proportional size of the
category in the privacy model. Higher-degree nodes are therefore less likely
to forward messages, since they are assigned to the less open categories —
which is analogous to behaving less altruistically — and so any performance
impact due to the privacy model is maximised.
• Central nodes open: As a baseline, we perform simulations with the opposite
allocation strategy to central nodes open. The nodes are ranked from lowest
to highest degree-centrality (the reverse ordering to Central nodes closed), and
then allocated to categories as before. The lowest-degree nodes are then less
likely to forward messages, while the highest-degree nodes are more likely
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to do so.
• Random category allocation: As a further baseline, nodes are assigned random-
ly to categories, with allocation probability proportional to the size of each
category. Centrality is not considered in the allocation process.
Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode for these three category allocation methods.
Algorithm 1 Nodes’ category allocation
1: if allocation scheme == ‘random’ then
2: for all node in nodes do
3: node category← random category (weighted by category size)
4: else
5: ordered nodes stack← []
6: if allocation scheme == ‘central nodes closed’ then
7: ordered nodes stack← [nodes ordered by descending centrality]
8: else if allocation scheme == ‘central nodes open’ then
9: ordered nodes stack← [nodes ordered by ascending centrality]
10: for all category in categories do
11: wanted category size[category]←
num nodes ∗ proportional size[category]
12: while node← pop ordered nodes do
13: for all category in [closed, social, variable, open] do
14: if num in category[category] < wanted category size[category]
&& node category is unassigned then
15: node category← category
We define two modes of privacy behaviour to apply the privacy models for the
real and simulation groups to our opportunistic network simulations. While it is
possible to think of many more behaviours, we believe that two modes are suffi-
cient for investigating the impact of privacy. Previous work has also demonstrated
that a constrained number of privacy choices is a usable compromise for privacy
policies for ubiquitous computing environments [84]. Our chosen modes are:
• Friendly (F): Nodes are modelled as being willing to share with their social
network friends. If the overall privacy choice is everyone, then the nodes
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behave as in the default case; if nobody, then messages are not exchanged;
if friends, then as the default case only if the two nodes involved in this
encounter are friends (otherwise messages are not exchanged).
• PubPriv (PP): Nodes are modelled as either being fully public (no privacy
concerns), or fully private (any privacy concerns result in disregarding the
encounter) — with nothing in-between. If the overall privacy behaviour dur-
ing an encounter is everyone, then messages are exchanged as in the default
case. Otherwise (i.e., if the overall privacy behaviour is friends or nobody),
messages are not exchanged.
During each encounter between a pair of nodes, each of the two nodes random-
ly picks a privacy behaviour of {nobody, f riends, everyone}, weighted according
to the location-sharing proportions associated with that node’s category. Mes-
sages are then exchanged depending on the chosen privacy behaviours for that
encounter. The overriding choice is the more restrictive of the two nodes’ privacy
behaviours. For example, if one node picks nobody and the other picks everyone,
then the overall choice is the more restrictive nobody.
Algorithm 2 shows pseudocode for the logic behind choosing whether messages
are exchanged between nodes during each encounter, for each of the privacy modes.
4.4.4 Results
Figures 4.5–4.10 show the performance simulation results. Delivery ratios, as would
be expected, are consistently lower in each case for the simulations using the pri-
vacy modes (Friendly or PubPriv) compared to the SRSNR baseline.
For the SASSY dataset, Figure 4.5 shows that delivery ratios are generally low-
er for the real group than the simulation group — significantly so for the Pub-
Priv mode. Additionally, delivery ratios under the PubPriv mode are lower than
the Friendly mode; the performance difference between the two privacy modes
are significantly greater than differences between the real and simulation groups.
Similar performance trends appear for delivery delays, as shown in Figure 4.6:















































































Figure 4.5: SASSY dataset: Delivery ratio baseline, and delivery ratios for the real
and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation methods.
Delivery ratios under the two privacy modes are lower than for the Baseline, as
expected. Delivery ratios are generally lower for the real group than the simulation
group, and lower for the PubPriv mode than the Friendly mode; the differences
between the privacy modes are significantly greater than the differences between




















































































Figure 4.6: SASSY dataset: Delivery delay baseline, and delivery delays for the
real and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation meth-
ods. Performance trends are similar to Figure 4.5: lower performance (i.e., higher
delivery delay) for the real group than the simulation group, and lower for the








































































Figure 4.7: Reality Mining dataset: Delivery ratio baseline, and delivery ratios
for the real and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation
methods. Delivery ratios are low for the Friendly privacy mode, and very low
for the PubPriv mode — falling to zero when magnifying differences under the
central nodes closed allocation scheme. Delivery ratios are similar for the real and



















































































Figure 4.8: Reality Mining dataset: Delivery delay baseline, and delivery delays
for the real and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation
methods. There are no significant differences between delivery delays. In cases
















































































Figure 4.9: LocShare dataset: Delivery ratio baseline, and delivery ratios for the real
and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation methods.
Delivery ratio performance trends for the sparse LocShare dataset are similar to the
also-sparse Reality Mining dataset (Figure 4.7). In particular, for the PubPriv mode



















































































Figure 4.10: LocShare dataset: Delivery delay baseline, and delivery delays for
the real and simulation groups under two privacy models and three allocation
methods. Similarly to the Reality Mining dataset (Figure 4.8), delivery delays show
wider variation under the privacy modes than the baseline, but are generally sim-
ilar under each privacy mode. The exception is the PubPriv mode with central
nodes closed. Paradoxically, delivery delay is reduced; as for the synthetic model
(Figure 4.3(b)) this is an artifact of the correspondingly low delivery ratio.
62
Algorithm 2 Decision: exchange messages during encounter
procedure Encounter(nodeA, nodeB)
1: {The weighting of the privacy behaviour random choice is specified by the pri-
vacy model. Random weighting according to each node’s previously allocated
category.}
2: privacy behaviour[nodeA] ← random choice of {nobody, friends, everyone}
weighted by weightings for node category[nodeA]
3: privacy behaviour[nodeB] ← random choice of {nobody, friends, everyone}
weighted by weightings for node category[nodeB]
4: overall privacy behaviour ←more restrictive privacy choice of nodeA or nodeB
5: if mode == Friendly then
6: if (overall privacy behaviour == everyone) ||
(overall privacy behaviour == friends && are f riends(nodeA, nodeB))
then
7: messages are exchanged according to SRSNR (i.e., each message is for-
warded if the encountered node is a friend of the original message sender)
8: else
9: no messages are exchanged
10: else if mode == PubPriv then
11: if overall privacy behaviour == everyone then
12: messages are exchanged according to SRSNR
13: else
14: no messages are exchanged
tion simulation group, and lower for the PubPriv mode than the Friendly mode,
with differences greater between modes than between groups. In this densely-
connected dataset, there is little performance impact in each case when changing
node allocation method.
The Reality Mining dataset is sparser than the SASSY dataset, with lower absolute
delivery ratios as shown in Figure 4.7. Compared to the baseline, delivery ratios
are significantly lower for the Friendly privacy mode, and lower still for the Pub-
Priv mode — falling to zero for the PubPriv mode when using central nodes closed
or random node allocations. In each case, delivery ratios are similar for the real and
simulation groups: there is overlap in the boxes. Figure 4.8 shows that there are
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no significant differences between delivery delays, however: any differences are
lost in the noise. An exception is that delivery delays are less reliable for the cases
where delivery ratios (Figure 4.7) are (close to) zero.
Similarly to the Reality Mining dataset, the LocShare dataset is also sparse. Loc-
Share delivery ratio performance trends, shown in Figure 4.9, are similar to those
for Reality Mining (Figure 4.7). In particular, we note that for the PubPriv mode
under the central nodes closed allocation scheme, performance again falls to zero
— implying that the network is useless. Delivery delay results for LocShare (Fig-
ure 4.10), similarly to Reality Mining (Figure 4.8), show wider variation under the
privacy modes than the baseline, with any performance differences lost in the
noise. The exception is the PubPriv mode with the central nodes closed alloca-
tion scheme; paradoxically, as a consequence of the low delivery ratio, delivery
delay is reduced, as we have seen previously for the synthetic privacy model (Fig-
ure 4.3(b)).
4.5 Summary
We have presented a methodology to use empirically-measured privacy concerns
from a simulated application in order to simulate the potential performance impact
on future opportunistic networks. The empirical privacy models that we present
have been developed to be dataset-independent, and we have applied them to
three real-world traces.
The simulation results demonstrate that location privacy concerns may have a sig-
nificant impact on network performance. This applies both for a synthetic privacy
model and for an empirical privacy model. In the worst case, we find that the
opportunistic network performance (as measured by delivery ratio) may fall to
zero, implying that the network is useless.
Might it be possible to alleviate privacy concerns by using privacy-preserving rout-
ing protocols? If so then this may improve participation in the network, which
is paramount for performance. The next chapter examines this question, with a
focus on maintaining the privacy of the social graph; as discussed in Chapters 2.3.1
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and 4.2, social graph privacy and location privacy are entwined — improvements
to social graph privacy can therefore help to maintain (and thus allay concerns





We have seen in Chapter 4 that privacy concerns may have an impact on oppor-
tunistic network performance, as users reduce their participation in the network
in order to preserve their privacy. In this chapter, we consider mitigating a pas-
sive attack on privacy — against privacy of social contacts — through the use
of privacy-enhanced routing protocols. If the routing protocol maintains priva-
cy, then users may be more inclined to participate in the network as their privacy
concerns are alleviated.
In some simple social network routing schemes, such as SRSN Routing (SRSNR),
the sender’s friends list is transmitted in the clear along with each message. Inter-
mediate forwarding nodes are able to read the sender’s full friends list in plain
text.
Encrypting the friends list end-to-end can ensure privacy, but we would then lose
the advantages of social network routing: intermediate forwarding nodes would




If friends lists could be encrypted using pair-wise keys shared between each pair
of nodes, then an eavesdropper could not overhear the sensitive data. This has
two problems, however. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 3.2, we do not assume
the existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI) in opportunistic networks — due
to the nature of such networks, we regard building a PKI as extremely difficult at
best, and arguably impossible. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the sender may
not wish to broadcast their social network information to all of their contacts —
which would necessarily occur for this information to be used by these contacts as
intermediaries for routing.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, nodes may not have global knowledge about
the network. Therefore, inspired by [11], in this chapter we attempt to target the
privacy threats introduced by social network routing by modifying and obfuscat-
ing each sender’s friends list, on a per-message basis, at message generation time.
This may be performed locally at each node, without requiring any global knowl-
edge of the network. By modifying the friends lists, we aim to introduce plausible
deniability; each list transmitted is no longer a true copy of the friends list. By
obfuscating the friends lists, we aim to make it more difficult for a person with a
copy of a particular friends list to read out its contents.
The contributions of this chapter are:
• We introduce two novel routing protocols to enhance privacy in social net-
work routing without key management.
• We evaluate the performance of these protocols against real-world datasets,
and demonstrate that it is possible to obfuscate the social networking infor-
mation without a significant decrease in routing performance.
• We discuss the privacy gains in using these protocols, with reference to the
classes of attack that are mitigated.
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5.2 Privacy-enhanced routing protocols
We introduce two novel privacy-enhanced routing protocols. In these protocols, to
preserve privacy the sender modifies and obfuscates the copy of their friends list
included with each message, on a per-message basis, at message generation time.
5.2.1 Statisticulated Social Network Routing
Named for a portmanteau of statistical manipulation,1 our first scheme is Statisticu-
lated Social Network Routing (SSNR).
For each message transmitted, the sender perturbs the message’s copy of their
friends list — adding or removing nodes. While the friends list sent along with
the message will be based to some extent on the sender’s true friends list, and so
still useful for social network routing, the friends list has been modified by the
addition or removal of nodes. Any node seeing the friends list sent along with the
message now cannot say with certainty whether a particular node is truly one of
the sender’s friends, or truly not one of the sender’s friends.
The sender may in practice choose the level of manipulation of the friends list
on a per-message basis. In our evaluation, however, we examine routing perfor-
mance for a particular choice of modification degree of the sender’s friends list.
For instance, we may choose a +50% modification of the friends list. This nota-
tion signifies that the sender adds 50% more nodes to their friends list before mes-
sage transmission. We thus determine average performance for a particular degree
of friends list modification. For simplicity, we do not evaluate routing perfor-
mance while simultaneously adding and removing nodes; only for either adding
or removing nodes.
It would still be possible for a malicious person to average over the friends lists
included with many messages of one particular sender. But we have created much
1 Huff coins the term statisticulation in his book How to lie with statistics [73], where he writes:
“Misinforming people by the use of statistical material might be called statistical
manipulation; in a word (though not a very good one), statisticulation.”
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more work for this malicious person: many generated messages must be intercept-
ed, rather than just one single message to reveal all. We quantify and discuss the
nature of the improvement in security in detail in Chapter 5.4.
5.2.2 Obfuscated Social Network Routing
In our second scheme, Obfuscated Social Network Routing (OSNR), instead of trans-
mitting the sender’s friends list as a list of nodes, we embed the friends list within
a Bloom filter.
A Bloom filter [23] is a probabilistic data structure which allows probabilistic query-
ing for set membership. False negatives are not possible, but false positives are —
with increasing probability as the Bloom filter becomes more full. After inserting
each node in the sender’s friends list into a Bloom filter, we may regard the Bloom
filter itself as a non-trivially-reversible hash of the friends list.
We are not the first to leverage Bloom filters for privacy: Schnell et al. [123] describe
how similar records in a database can be linked using a Bloom filter, while main-
taining privacy of each record. To our knowledge, we are the first however to use
Bloom filters in the context of opportunistic network routing privacy. More recent-
ly, after we had published in [110, 111], Bianchi et al. have explicitly quantified the
privacy enhancement associated with Bloom filter use in general [17].
To make a rainbow table attack [107] impractical, we create a per-message random
salt, which is sent along with the message in the clear. The elements inserted into
the Bloom filter are a concatenation of this random salt with a unique node iden-
tifier (any unique node identifier would suffice, e.g., a lower layer construct such
as MAC address, Bluetooth address, IMEI, or some higher level identifier tied to
the user rather than the device). In our evaluation, we choose to use Bluetooth
addresses as the identifier.
Given the Bloom filter, the random salt (transmitted in the clear with the message)
and an encountered node’s identifier, it is easy to make a routing decision: query
for set membership of the random salt concatenated with the candidate node iden-
tifier. A positive result — guaranteed if the candidate node is inside the sender’s
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friends list, but also possible with low probability if not — means to forward the
message, since the encountered node is most likely in the original sender’s friends
list. A negative result means that the candidate node is not in the sender’s friends
list, and so not to forward the message.
Since we are not using encryption (we assume no PKI), it still may be possible
for an attacker to reverse engineer the Bloom filter by brute force — the attacker
can iterate through all the node identifiers, concatenating each with the plain-text
salt and testing for a Bloom filter match. This is orders of magnitude more work
than a rainbow table lookup, however, and the brute force step must be repeated
for every message. So using the Bloom filter (with salt) does not provide perfect
security, but does make the attacker’s job very much more difficult. We elaborate
and quantify this attack further in Chapter 5.4.
It is possible to combine OSNR and SSNR: the friends list may be modified as in
SSNR prior to hashing the social network information in a Bloom filter as in OSNR.
In our evaluation, we refer to this combined scheme as SSNR-OSNR.
We note that Bloom filters are fixed-width — a convenient property for scalability.
In pure SSNR, packet headers may grow arbitrarily large as the sender’s friends list
grows; this is potentially a problem for a sender with a very large social network
(and compounded if the social network is grown further using SSNR). OSNR, and
SSNR-OSNR, have no such scaling problem due to the fixed size of the Bloom filter.
5.3 Performance evaluation
We now present an evaluation of our two schemes to determine their impact on
opportunistic network performance, using trace-driven simulation.
5.3.1 Datasets
We choose the same three datasets as used previously in Chapter 4.3.1 to evaluate
our routing schemes: the SASSY, Reality Mining, and LocShare datasets. As previ-
ously mentioned, these datasets have different scales and structures.
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We also include supplementary results from a fourth dataset, the NUS dataset [133].
This dataset details weekly recurring class schedules for 22,341 students at the
National University of Singapore. Following the original dataset providers [132],
we regard an encounter between two students as occurring when the students
share a session, since the students are in physical proximity within the same class-
room. We regard two students as having one another as social contacts, so having
one another in each of their respective friends lists, if they share at least one session
in the week. The full NUS dataset contains 12.3M encounters and 6.2M social net-
work links. Due to memory constraints, we therefore sample a subset of students
by two distinct processes, to derive two new, smaller datasets of 500 students each
— NUS-R and NUS-L— which we then use for the performance evaluation:
NUS-R is obtained by randomly choosing 500 students from the full NUS dataset.
Results from this dataset may reflect a real-world opportunistic network deploy-
ment, where only a proportion of students participate in the opportunistic
network. A downside of random selection, however, is that due to the low
percentage of selected nodes, the cutdown social graph would intuitively be
expected to be relatively sparse, and so may exhibit different behaviour to
the original more densely-connected graph.
NUS-L is, in contrast, obtained by “growing” a social network of 500 students,
starting from an initial randomly-chosen student. Intuitively, the resultant
social network is intended to exhibit more natural connectedness properties,
similar to the full social network, while being size-reduced.
The full details of the two sampling processes are provided in Appendix A.1.4.
5.3.2 Simulation parameters
We performed trace-driven simulations using these datasets with the following
parameters:
• 900 messages generated per simulation. Each message was unicast from a
random sender to a random recipient from that sender’s contacts list.
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– SASSY, Reality Mining & LocShare: We simulate 30 days (choosing a ran-
dom 30 days in the case of Reality Mining), and generate 30 messages
per day.
– NUS-R & NUS-L: Exploiting the cyclic nature of the dataset, for each
simulation we select one full week of six business days, each with 13
business hours,2 beginning each simulation at a random time through-
out the week. That is, we duplicate the first week to obtain an identical
second week, then select out a random one-week period from these two
weeks for each simulation run. We simulate 150 messages for each of
the six business days; total 900 messages.
• Each message has a TTL of one day:
– SASSY, Reality Mining & LocShare: 24 hours.
– NUS-R & NUS-L: 13 business hours, reflecting one business day in the
compressed business time representation of the original NUS dataset.
• 10 runs for each set of parameters
• SSNR obfuscation from -80% to +200% at 20% intervals.3 When adding nodes
to the sender’s contact list, the nodes added are chosen from the pool of
nodes present within the dataset (and within the given time slice from the
dataset, in the case of Reality Mining).
For the SASSY dataset, which contains location information, we used a modified
version of the ONE simulator [86], which included our augmented random way-
point model, to generate ns-2 traces. For speed, we used ns-2 rather than ONE for
all of the simulations. For the Reality Mining and the two NUS datasets, which have
no location information, we could not use ns-2, so instead used a Python program
to parse the encounters and simulate message-passing.
2The original, raw dataset is “compressed” to “business hours”, not real time. [132]
3For some messages, it may not be possible to continue adding or removing nodes to reach the
target modification — if we reach the upper bound of all nodes in the dataset added, or the lower
bound of only one node remaining in the sender’s social network, we stop adding or removing




To evaluate our simulations, we use the widely-used metrics from [75], as noted in
Chapter 2.2.1:
• Delivery ratio: the proportion of messages that were delivered, out of the total
number of unique messages created.
• Delivery delay: the length of time taken for a message to reach its destination:
the time between the time at which the message is first sent, and the time at
which the message first arrives.
• Delivery cost: the total number of messages (including duplicates) transmit-
ted, normalised by the total number of unique messages created.
When computing these metrics, we disregard messages which were directly trans-
mitted from original sender to final receiver. In the NUS derived datasets, there is a
high rate of such encounters — because we derive social network information from
the encounters — and so leaving in these messages obscures the performance of
(non-trivial) social-network routing, where messages reach their destination via at
least one intermediary. For the other datasets, although incidence is not so high, we
also disregard such messages so as to allow comparisons across datasets. The per-
formance of social-network routing is therefore underestimated: higher delivery
ratios and lower delivery delay would be achievable if we allowed such messages
in our analysis.
5.3.4 OSNR implementation
Since the false positive rate of a Bloom filter depends on the length of the Bloom
filter, and the number of elements in the Bloom filter,4 but the number of elements
in the Bloom filter greatly varies between datasets (since the sizes of the friends
4 The Bloom filter false positive rate ε is approximately (1− e−kn/m)k, where k is the number of
hash functions (in our case, k = 4 since we split the 128-bit MD5 hash into four 32-bit integers); n




























Figure 5.1: OSNR false positive rate for each dataset (data in Appendix C). The
Bloom filter lengths were selected such that for pure OSNR (no SSNR modifica-
tion), the false positive rate would be approximately 1%.
lists vary depending on the scale of the dataset), we choose the Bloom filter length
on a per-dataset basis. We aim for a false positive rate of approximately 1% for the
unmodified social-network routing case (0% SSNR) in each dataset.
Figure 5.1 (data in Appendix C) shows the actual OSNR false positive rate for each
dataset, based on the average sizes of the routing friends lists and the lengths of
the Bloom filters in each dataset (24 bits for LocShare, 32 bits for Reality Mining, 128
bits for SASSY and NUS-R, and 1024 bits for NUS-L). The higher the average size
of the unmodified friends lists, the greater the length of the Bloom filter required in
order to target an initial 1% false positive rate. To insert each element (string repre-
sentation of a node ID concatenated with a random salt, as described in 5.2.2) into
the Bloom filter, the element’s 128-bit MD5 hash5 was divided into four 32-bit por-
5 MD5 is not collision-resistant, but we are only using the uniformity and one-way properties —
not the collision-resistance property — of MD5. A maliciously-generated collision does not affect
the security of our system, because the ability to generate a collision would merely result in another
false positive in routing. Such false positives already occur with Bloom filters, and can more easily
be triggered by manually setting more bits of the Bloom filter to 1 than by maliciously crafting an
MD5 collision.
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tions, each interpreted as a 32-bit integer. Taking each of these four integers mod
the Bloom filter length L resulted in four values in range 0..(L− 1). These four val-
ues were interpreted as indices for bits in the Bloom filter; and the corresponding
bits were, if not already 1, set to 1.
5.3.5 Results
Figures 5.2–5.6 show our trace-driven simulation results for our routing schemes
for each dataset (SASSY, Reality Mining, LocShare, NUS-L, NUS-R).
OSNR performance
We note that for every set of friends list size reductions for each of our three metrics,
the OSNR scheme did not significantly impact routing performance.
Figure 5.1 offers an insight into why this may be: for pure OSNR (no SSNR modifi-
cations), the false positive rate was set — by choosing the length of the Bloom filter
— to approximately 1%, as we discussed previously. This 1% false positive rate did
not significantly affect routing performance, by any of our metrics. When remov-
ing nodes from the senders’ friends lists, the false positive rate further decreases —
and the decreased false positive rates also do not significantly affect performance
by our metrics.
OSNR thus only ever had a noticeable impact on routing performance when increas-
ing the size of the senders’ friends lists. Even then this impact was often not sig-
nificant (as for the SASSY dataset, shown in Figures 5.2(a)–5.2(b)).
On the few occasions when a significant difference between SSNR and SSNR-
OSNR was visible — such as the upper end of friends list size increases for the
Reality Mining dataset as shown in Figure 5.3(c) — we note from comparison to
Figure 5.1 that the false positive rate for the Bloom filter had grown very high




































Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(a) Message delivery ratio vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence inter-
vals. It is possible to remove 40% of the
sender’s friends list each message while still
retaining high message delivery ratios. Rel-
ative to baseline SRSNR, 88% of messages
arrive after removing 40% of the source




















Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(b) Message delivery delay vs target mod-
ification of the size of the sender’s friends
list. As we remove from the sender’s friends
list, delivery delay increases — but only
from about 5 to 6 hours with a−40% change




























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(c) Message delivery cost vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
As we perturb the sender’s friends list by
adding links, the delivery cost increases.


































Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(a) Message delivery ratio vs target modi-
fication of the size of the sender’s friends
list. It is possible to change the sender’s
friends list size by −40% without signifi-
























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(b) Message delivery delay vs target mod-
ification of the size of the sender’s friends
list. The impact on delivery delay when


























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(c) Message delivery cost vs target modi-
fication of the size of the sender’s friends
list. As we perturb the sender’s friends list
by adding fake friends, the delivery cost
increases. When using OSNR, the false pos-
itives associated with using a Bloom filter
also lead to an increase in delivery cost.

































Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(a) Message delivery ratio vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
It is possible to change the sender’s friends
list size by up to−20% without significantly



















Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(b) Message delivery delay vs target mod-
ification of the size of the sender’s friends
list. The impact on delivery delay when


























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(c) Message delivery cost vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
As we perturb the sender’s friends list by
adding fake friends, the delivery cost slow-
ly increases.






































Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(a) Message delivery ratio vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
It is possible to remove 40% of the sender’s
friends list each message while still retain-




























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(b) Message delivery delay vs target mod-
ification of the size of the sender’s friends
list. As we remove from the sender’s friends
list, there seems to be a slight trend towards
increasing delivery delay — but the increase
is slight both in absolute terms, and in rela-


























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(c) Message delivery cost vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
As we perturb the sender’s friends list by
adding links, the delivery cost increases.




































Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(a) Message delivery ratio vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
After removing 40% of the sender’s friends
list each message, the error bars still over-
lap when compared to baseline SRSNR —
although the means differ, the difference is

























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(b) Message delivery delay vs target mod-
ification of the size of the sender’s friends
list. The impact on delivery delay when


























Senders’ friends list size change (target %)
SSNR
SSNR-OSNR
(c) Message delivery cost vs target modifi-
cation of the size of the sender’s friends list.
As we perturb the sender’s friends list by
adding fake friends, the delivery cost does
not significantly change when using pure
SSNR, but does increase when using com-
bined SSNR-OSNR. This may be because of
the high false positive rate, c.f. Figure 5.1.
When removing from the friends list, the
delivery cost decreases for both schemes
(pure SSNR and SSNR-OSNR).
Figure 5.6: NUS-R dataset.
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SSNR performance
Delivery ratio Figure 5.2(a) shows that for the SASSY dataset, the delivery ratio
is high for all tested social network size target modifications. It is possible to
remove 40% of the nodes from the senders’ friends lists, while still retaining a
good delivery ratio: almost 90% of the ratio when not modifying the social net-
work at all. Note that it is possible for the delivery ratio to increase when adding
nodes to senders’ friends lists (i.e., for a delivery ratio of over 100% that of using
unmodified friends lists); by adding such nodes we are moving closer towards the
best-case delivery ratio scenario of epidemic routing, where messages are forward-
ed during all encounters.
Figure 5.5(a) and Figure 5.6(a) show similar results for the two datasets derived
from NUS. Although the absolute figures for delivery ratio are different due to the
differing relative connectedness of NUS-L and NUS-R, the trend for the normalised
delivery ratios are similar. Picking out the same −40% SSNR modification of the
senders’ friends lists, we note that, although the means differ (90% of unmodified
social-network routing for NUS-L; 70% of unmodified social-network routing for
NUS-R), the difference is smaller than the noise: the error bars overlap.
Although noisier, and with much lower absolute delivery ratios, than the other
datasets, we see a similar result holds again for the delivery ratios in the Reality
Mining dataset in Figure 5.3(a). It is possible to make large modifications to the
sizes of the senders’ friends lists without significantly affecting the delivery ratio,
relative to the error margins.
For the LocShare dataset, however, Figure 5.4(a) shows that delivery ratios do fall
sharply beyond−20% changes in friends list size. We believe that this is an artifact
of low starting size of the friends lists (in absolute terms) of each node in this
dataset, as shown in Appendix A.2: an already-sparse dataset is made sparser still,
reaching a tipping point in delivery ratio performance.
Delivery delay Figure 5.2(b) shows that for the SASSY dataset, delivery delay
increases somewhat when removing nodes from the sender’s friends list. This
increase is only from about 4.8 to 5.8 hours when using −40% SSNR compared to
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unmodified social-network routing. Indeed, if delivery delay is a concern, we may
also reduce delivery delay by adding nodes with SSNR.
For the other datasets, the difference is typically not significant: Figure 5.3(b) (Real-
ity Mining); Figure 5.4(b) (LocShare); Figure 5.5(b) (NUS-L); Figure 5.6(b) (NUS-R)
all show little (if any) correlation between delivery delay and modification of the
senders’ friends lists. If such a difference exists, it is smaller than the noise — the
error bars overlap within each dataset for each set of SSNR parameters.
We note an artifact in the results: where delivery ratios are very close to zero (i.e.,
Figure 5.3(a) shows Reality Mining at−80% SSNR and Figure 5.4(a) shows LocShare
at −40% SSNR and beyond), the corresponding delivery delay values take more
extreme values.
Delivery cost Figure 5.2(c) shows that for the SASSY dataset, delivery cost is
quite significantly affected by modifying the sender’s target friends list size: the
fewer nodes in the modified sender’s friends list, the lower the cost of sending a
message. Compared to baseline SRSNR, with 50 data messages per unique mes-
sage, a −40% change in sender friends list results in only 20 data messages: fewer
than half as many data messages. This corresponds to the result from Figure 5.2(a),
where we still retain a high delivery ratio. By applying SSNR, we have actual-
ly improved performance by this metric, by reducing the delivery cost, but while
simultaneously retaining a good delivery ratio — and increasing the sender’s pri-
vacy by not revealing some of their true friends.
Figure 5.5(c) and Figure 5.6(c) show similar results (in relative, not absolute, terms)
for delivery cost for the NUS-L and NUS-R datasets, when removing from the
senders’ friends lists. A −40% change in the size of these lists results in a more
than halving of data messages for both datasets. The relative differences are large,
though: for NUS-L the change in cost is from 1900 to 700, while for NUS-R the
change in cost is from 37 to 17. The absolute difference is again presumably due to
the differing degrees of connectivity of the datasets, as illustrated earlier in this sec-
tion. The differing connectivity presumably also accounts for the differing perfor-
mance of pure SSNR when increasing the senders’ friends lists for these datasets:
for the highly-connected NUS-L dataset, encounters with the “fake” new friends
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are likely, increasing delivery cost, while for the less-connected NUS-R dataset
such encounters do not occur so much, keeping delivery cost about constant. We
note that combined SSNR-OSNR does show an increase in delivery cost for NUS-R,
because extra encounters do occur (and with high false positive rates for the Bloom
filter result in message forwarding) — but the number of such extra encounters is
high relative to the relatively-small size of the senders’ friends lists (as shown in
Figure A.2), and hence the absolute number of extra forwarding opportunities in
pure SSNR is low, keeping the delivery cost unchanged.
Figure 5.4(c) shows little change in delivery cost for the LocShare dataset when
removing from the senders’ friends lists, since the baseline cost is close to the min-
imum cost that can be measured by these simulations (i.e., two copies of each mes-
sage: one from sender to intermediate node, and one from intermediate node to
destination). There is, however, a slow increase in cost on adding to the senders’
friends lists.
Figure 5.3(c) shows that delivery cost for the Reality Mining dataset stays fairly
constant (since it is so low in absolute terms) in applying SSNR which reduces the
friends lists sizes: the delivery cost falls from five messages to three messages on
applying −40% SSNR. A similar effect is seen on applying SSNR which increases
the friends lists sizes as for the NUS-R dataset. The senders’ friends lists are, in
absolute terms, small, as shown in Figure A.2. So increasing the relative size of
the friends lists does not dramatically change the delivery cost with pure SSNR,
since few encounters occur with the added fake friends. When adding these fake
friends on applying combined SSNR-OSNR, however, the false positive rate ends
up high (as shown in Figure 5.1) — about 30% at the upper end of the scale. This
means that extra messages are forwarded, as triggered by this high false positive
rate. Hence the delivery cost increases.
Performance summary Finally, we observe that it is possible to significantly mod-
ify the size of the sender’s friends list (for example, by−40% for all datasets except
LocShare), thus increasing the privacy of the sender, and yet to still retain good rout-
ing performance. Indeed, removing nodes may significantly reduce delivery cost
— a beneficial side effect while enhancing privacy. If delivery delay or ratio is more
of a concern, conversely, SSNR allows adding nodes to improve performance by
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these metrics, again while enhancing privacy, though at the expense of increased
delivery cost in this case.
We quantify the improvement in security in the next section. We use the −40%
friends list size change in subsequent analysis, since this was the largest size change
that allowed performance to be maintained in most of the datasets.
5.4 Security discussion
The simulation experiments in Chapter 5.3 demonstrate that our schemes are prac-
tical with respect to performance: we are able to obfuscate the friends lists used for
routing without a large impact on opportunistic network performance. We now
consider the practicality of our schemes with respect to security — we discuss the
privacy gains in using our schemes, with reference to classes of attack which are
mitigated.
5.4.1 Security of OSNR
We first consider the OSNR scheme — where we hash the friends list of the sender
to a Bloom filter.
In a naı¨ve SRSNR implementation, an attacker may read the sender’s friends list in
plain text from one single eavesdropped message, as might an intermediate node
who has legitimately received a message for forwarding. By hashing the sender’s
friends list to a Bloom filter, we raise the bar for a curious, casual observer — such
as one of the sender’s friends who legitimately receives a message as part of social-
network routing. Our scheme keeps honest people honest. But we also increase
the effort required by a malicious attacker. By how much?
OSNR with single intercepted message
In this attack an attacker attempts to reverse the Bloom filter, i.e., deduce the
sender’s original friends list from the Bloom filter. The attacker does so by iter-
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ating through the universe of elements that may be contained within the Bloom
filter, and testing the Bloom filter for membership of each of these elements. For
example, if a Bloom filter contains (salted) elements concatenated with a 32-bit
node identifier (address), then to reverse the Bloom filter one should test each of
the 232 (similarly salted) addresses, for presence in the Bloom filter.
To give an impression of the expected effort required for an attacker with contem-
porary hardware to reverse the Bloom filters used in Chapter 5.3, we tested how
long it might take to iterate through the complete universe of 32-bit addresses on
a server with two Intel Xeon L5320 processors (2x quad core at 1.86GHz). We were
able to test approximately 214 addresses (concatenated with salt) for presence in a
Bloom filter per CPU core per second. Iterating through the universe of address-
es took 58 CPU-hours. With a larger address space (e.g., Bluetooth uses 48-bit
addresses), the expected effort required would be greater still.
Since Bloom filters guarantee no false negatives, all of the addresses encoded inside
the Bloom filter would be found by such iteration through all possible elements
Bloom filters produce false positives, however, with a known rate ε — e.g., we
targeted ε = 1% in choosing the Bloom filter length in our experiments. There-
fore, the addresses truly encoded in the Bloom filter would be lost in the sea of
false positives: with 4.3B addresses, we would expect 43M false positives. Thus
an attacker would find it difficult to accurately deduce a node’s friends list from
eavesdropping a single message.
OSNR with multiple intercepted messages
We now consider an attacker who can intercept multiple messages. In our OSNR
scheme, each subsequent intercepted message would allow the attacker to reduce
the set of false positives (size f ) to a new subset of size ≈ ε · f , each round.
Therefore, for Bluetooth addresses (232 possible addresses) and a false positive rate
ε = 1%, the expected number of false positives, f , after intercepting n distinct
messages is f = 232 · 0.01n.
To recover the original friends list of the sender, the attacker must intercept suffi-
ciently many messages, n, that f < 1. Rearranging the previous equation, this is
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n = log0.01(2−32) ' 4.8 ' 5.
So under the assumptions above, the attacker must intercept approximately five
distinct messages in order to recover the sender’s original friends list.
The bulk of the computational burden on the attacker is reversing the first inter-
cepted message’s Bloom filter. After that, the attacker need only test the exponentially-
decreasing number of elements from the previous rounds against newly-intercepted
Bloom filters.
Implications of combined SSNR-OSNR
The combined SSNR-OSNR scheme is able to mitigate the eavesdropping attack,
but how many distinct messages must an attacker intercept in order to recover the
original friends list of a sender who is employing SSNR?
Chapter 5.3 shows that SSNR allows us to randomly remove 40% of the sender’s
true friends list per message without a major degradation in social-network rout-
ing performance. Using −40% SSNR, the probability of each member in a friends
list appearing in a given message is 1− 0.4 = 0.6. As the attacker intercepts a num-
ber of messages n, the number of messages x in which a given member of a friends
list appears (with appearance being random per message) is therefore binomially
distributed, x ∼ B(n, 0.6).
Figure 5.7 shows the probability of the attacker identifying each friends list node as
n increases, according to different threshold values of x, again using −40% SSNR.
Using pure SSNR, the threshold is x ≥ 1 — there are no false positives. To identify
95% of friends list nodes, four messages must be intercepted.
In practice, though, we combine SSNR-OSNR. The false positive rate is now defined
by the Bloom filter. Using a ε = 1% as in our previous discussion, a suitable thresh-
old might be x ≥ 3 — the attacker may be confident that a friends list node is truly
identified if the node appears in three or more intercepted distinct messages. Using
this threshold, Figure 5.7 shows that the attacker must intercept eight messages in





























Number of intercepted messages
Node in >=1 intercepted messages
Node in >=2 intercepted messages
Node in >=3 intercepted messages
Figure 5.7: Probability of identifying each node within the sender’s original social
network after applying SSNR (−40%), as a function of the number of distinct mes-
sages intercepted. Using SSNR-OSNR, we consider the attacker as identifying a
friends list node if that node appears in three or more distinct intercepted mes-
sages. To identify 95% of nodes, the attacker must intercept eight distinct mes-
sages.
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Moreover, when combining SSNR-OSNR, the optimisation in Chapter 5.4.1 (dis-
carding all addresses except those that were flagged up in previous rounds; initial-
ly mostly false positives but with the true addresses mixed in too) is also defeated
since false negatives are now possible, further increasing the computational bur-
den on the attacker.
Burden on the attacker
If an attacker must collect approximately eight messages in order to deduce the
original sender’s friends list, then how practical an attack is this?
Firstly, these messages need to be distinct. In OSNR, the Bloom filter is added
by the original sender at the time of message generation, and is not altered en-
route during routing. Therefore, distinct messages must be intercepted in order
to obtain messages with different Bloom filters — it is not useful to capture the
same message as it is routed through the network since the Bloom filter will be
unchanged. Most opportunistic network implementations, however, are likely to
employ bundle protocols which aggregate many application-layer data units into
few network-layer data units for forwarding [57], thus hindering the eavesdrop-
ping of multiple messages.
To collect these messages, the attacker could shadow the sender, but if this were
possible, then the attacker could directly observe the sender’s interactions with
other nodes and directly measure the sender’s social network, rendering the attack
redundant. An alternative strategy is to eavesdrop constantly in a well-known
busy spot. Again, if this were possible, then an attacker could directly observe the
social networks of many nodes.
Our schemes, therefore, are not infallible, but instead serve to raise the amount of
effort required for an attack. Instead of being able to discover a sender’s friends
list by intercepting a single message and then reading off the data in plain-text, the
attacker must now intercept multiple messages, and then devote multiple days of
CPU time to the attack.
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5.4.2 Linkability
While the bar for an attacker has been raised significantly for reversing a single
sender’s friends list, so too has the bar been raised much more for obtaining even
a relatively small portion of the whole social network.
The structure of the social network itself is sensitive information, as we have dis-
cussed previously in Chapter 3.2.4. For example, as earlier noted, Narayanan and
Shmatikov have shown that it is possible to link individuals who are members of
different online social networks, based on no more information than anonymised
node-edge graphs of both social networks [105]. Anonymity of social network par-
ticipants is thus not sufficient for privacy, since the participants may be linked to
another social network in which they also participate.
Narayanan’s deanonymisation algorithm is described as being “robust to mild
modifications of the topology such as those introduced by sanitization”. This is
because it deanonymises nodes by starting out at known seeds whose with posi-
tions known in both networks, and then crawling outwards from those seeds to
find corresponding nodes in the two networks.
Thus, to be able to use this algorithm against an opportunistic network, an attacker
would now have to be able to deduce accurate friends lists for a significant propor-
tion of nodes close together in the social network. Crucially, the algorithm cannot
“jump the gap” between disconnected subgraphs, so deducing the friends lists of
some isolated nodes is not sufficient: the attack would only succeed if large-scale
deduction of all the friends lists for nodes within a connected sub-graph of the
social network were achieved by the attacker.
Such an attack would be difficult, but feasible. A single eavesdropped message
would reveal the sender’s complete local friends list information. Thus, by sniffing
a sample of messages, the attacker may be able to gain enough information to
reconstruct a fairly sizeable connected subgraph of the complete social network.
Our SSNR-OSNR scheme prevents this attack from being successful — or, at least,
raises the bar very much higher for a potential attacker. The number of messages
that must be sniffed is increased of the order of tenfold, since, as discussed in the
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previous section, approximately eight distinct messages from each sender must be
intercepted to obtain the sender’s local social network neighbours (their friends
list) with some reasonable confidence. This must be repeated for each sender.
It therefore appears that our scheme may make these linkability attacks difficult,
and, we believe, impractical.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented two schemes to enhance privacy in social-
network routing, which may be run locally at each node without requiring glob-
al knowledge about the network. The social network information is still used to
inform routing decisions, but in a perturbed and obfuscated form.
We have seen that it is possible to perturb a sender’s friends list by removing up to
40% of the nodes, while still maintaining a mean delivery ratio approximately 90%
that of unaltered social-network routing. Complementarily, using Bloom filters we
can mitigate eavesdropping of social network information with a minimal effect
on network performance.
We have evaluated these two schemes using a selection of real-world opportunis-
tic network datasets. Although these datasets vary widely in many properties
(including scale, location and connectivity), our findings appear to hold for all,
which gives us confidence that our schemes would be deployable in a real-world
opportunistic network. We have also considered attacks against our schemes, and
demonstrated the classes of attack which we may mitigate.
But another security threat for an opportunistic network is an active attack on
availability, rather than a passive attack on privacy. In the next chapter, we explore
the efficacy of such an attack, and how we might mitigate the threat through the
use of a new lightweight, local protocol.
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Chapter 6
Flooding attack mitigation using
social network information
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we introduced two privacy-enhanced opportunistic network routing
protocols. The protocols aim to protect potentially-private social network informa-
tion from being easily passively eavesdropped, while maintaining social network
routing performance.
But we have seen in Chapter 2.3.2 that opportunistic network users may also be
exposed to active attacks. In particular, in Chapter 3.3 we noted a research gap
in considering opportunistic network flooding attacks. We therefore focus on this
particular type of flooding attack in this chapter.
Since it is difficult to determine reliably the sender of a message in an opportunis-
tic network, a malicious user can untraceably flood the network with spoofed mes-
sages. As the available resources of participating devices (e.g., battery) are finite,
and may be drained by receiving and retransmitting these messages, this flooding
attack may therefore act as a denial-of-service attack against participating network
nodes.
Our goal is to mitigate such a flooding attack, while maintaining the utility of the
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opportunistic network. The contributions of this chapter are:
• We formalise a flooding-based resource-consuming attack, and simulate the
efficacy of the attack using real-world traces.
• We build a routing protocol that through using social network information is
resistant to the attack.
• We demonstrate through trace-driven simulation that the attack-resistant pro-
tocol mitigates the attack, while at the same time maintaining the utility of
the network.
6.2 Attack model and defence
Our goal is to investigate the impact of a flooding attack on an opportunistic net-
work, and to mitigate this attack. In a flooding attack, the attacker floods the net-
work with messages. Network nodes receive and relay copies of these messages
throughout the network, consuming their finite resources (such as battery) in the
process. The intent of the attacker is to overload these finite resources, causing
nodes to fail, and consequently degrading overall network performance.
In order to formalise this attack, we consider an attacker with certain, limited capa-
bilities, which we enumerate and formalise within the following attack model.
6.2.1 Attack model
As in previous chapters, we focus on SRSN Routing (SRSNR). Each node has a
set of friends. The original sender of each message embeds a copy of their list of
friends within the message, as part of its headers. This friends list then informs the
routing of the message through the network: if a node appears in this list, then it
will relay the message. For redundancy, the message is multiply copied, and thus
may take more than one path to reach its destination.
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We make the following assumptions, inspired by [30], about the capabilities of the
attacker:
1. Spoofing messages: Messages are clear text, so the attacker can spoof any head-
er of the message — or the entire message.
2. Identity: Nodes have some form of identifier within the network (e.g., MAC-
layer address). In the absence of public key cryptography, this identifier can
be spoofed on a per-message basis by an attacker.
Making these assumptions, the attacker may perform a simple flooding attack.
When encountering another node, the attacker can generate a new message. This
message, however, has spoofed headers, falsely indicating that it should be routed
via the node — i.e., the node will believe that it is relaying the message on behalf
of one of its friends.
Worse, the attacker can additionally spoof the “friends list” (i.e., the set of nodes
which should relay the message) header, with a permissive set of nodes. This
allows amplification of the attack: after the attacker injects the initial message into
the network — by sending to the encountered node — the message will then be
relayed, consuming further resources without additional cost to the attacker. This
amplification is crucial to the attack: a relatively small number of messages gener-
ated by the attacker may be amplified many times throughout the network, thus
consuming disproportionate network resources.
To further increase the attack, the attacker may spoof multiple MAC-layer address-
es, in a manner similar to the Sybil attack [51]. This allow the attacker to send
a larger number of messages to each encountered node: the node cannot black-
list a single MAC-layer identifier which generates numerous messages in a single
encounter, because the messages appear to have been sent from numerous other
encountered nodes.
Finally, the attacker may set an undeliverable destination address for the message.
This ensures that the message will propagate as much as possible through the net-
work (i.e., consuming greater resources), since it will never be delivered.
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6.2.2 Defence
Due to the spoofing of headers, the above attack is difficult to detect at any node,
using only its local knowledge. There is no way to determine a message’s true
origin. Therefore, even if a particular message should somehow be identified as
an attack message, this lack of accountability and traceback means that only this
one message would be locally dropped; the attacker may continue flooding other
messages, under a new identifier.
We therefore introduce a new security requirement and assumption. The intention
is to enable a lightweight scheme, where nodes authenticate that messages which
they are willing to receive and relay are truly generated by one of their friends.
We require a public/private key pair for each node. Each message is signed by its
original sender, allowing any node knowing the sender’s public key to verify the
message origin.
One limitation of this scheme is that we require key distribution. As discussed in
Chapter 3.2, a fully-fledged PKI may be unrealistic for a fully decentralised net-
work. We note, however, that nodes have friends with whom they communicate,
and as a prerequisite for SRSNR locally know who their friends are.
We therefore introduce a new assumption that friends know one another’s public keys.
These public keys may be shared between friends out-of-band of the opportunistic
network without requiring a full PKI: possibly in a physical meeting, by earlier
communication via traditional networking infrastructure, or even via snail-mail.
Similar approaches to key exchange are used in some existing systems, for example
Threema1, a non-opportunistic mobile messaging application; security-conscious
users may exchange keys in-person (scanning machine-readable QR codes), to
enable later secure communication over untrusted networks.
Since messages in the network are only relayed by the original sender’s friends,
each relay node can thus verify that the message sender is truly their trusted
friend by checking the signature (Algorithm 3): if the message is not signed by




Algorithm 3 Message check: only accept a message for relaying if the original
message sender is a trusted friend.
1: if friends with(message’s original sender) and
has valid original sender signature(message) then
2: accept message for relaying
3: else
4: discard message
It remains possible, however, for a node with genuine friendship links to other
nodes to flood messages into the network; these messages will be authenticated
and relayed by the attacker’s friends. But this is a more expensive attack: the
attacker must create genuine “friendship” relations with the nodes being attacked,
and faking such a social relation is more expensive than spoofing a message. Addi-
tionally, even if a node can “trick” other nodes into becoming friends with it, the
attack may still be mitigated. Each network node can now detect the attack, by
looking locally at the messages which it has received for relaying. Each message
can be linked back to its original sender. If a particular sender has generated exces-
sive network traffic then this node can be blocked (i.e., blacklisted for relaying mes-
sages). This means that network nodes either (i) block the attacker locally, if the
attacker has been successful in generating abnormally much traffic at that node, or
(ii) do not see abnormal traffic from the attacker (perhaps due to the attack being
throttled), in which case the attack is also unsuccessful. Either way, the attack is
mitigated.
We note that other, more limited, wireless attacks may still be possible. For exam-
ple, the attacker may attempt to overwhelm a single proximate node by transmit-
ting invalid messages to it at a very high rate, as in a jamming attack [113]. The
energy usage by the individual node to receive these messages — even if the mes-
sages are then immediately discarded as invalid — may drain its battery and take
the node offline. But this is a weaker attack, i.e., without message amplification
throughout the network. We consider targeted attacks on individual proximate
nodes as out of scope for this chapter; our focus is mitigating flooding attacks with
amplification.
Our proposed scheme relies on leveraging trusted social contacts. Using trusted
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social contacts to improve security in DTNs has been described by El Defrawy et al.,
but in the context of preserving privacy rather than maintaining availability [55].
Whitelisting messages from immediate social contacts has been introduced in the
context of email by Garriss et al. [63], and extended for more distant social contacts
by Hameed et al. [68] — but both rely on a centralised architecture, and do not
generalise to decentralised networks.
6.3 Evaluation
We now present an evaluation of the flooding attack on network performance, with
and without the defence.
As in Chapters 4–5, we perform trace-driven simulation using a custom Python
opportunistic-network simulator against the same three real-world datasets: SASSY,
Reality Mining, and LocShare. Encounters and social network information are
obtained for each dataset as discussed in previous chapters.
6.3.1 Simulation parameters
In line with the simulations detailed in previous chapters, we use the following
simulation parameters:
• 100 runs per data point.
• One week of simulation time per run.2
• Average of one (non-attack) message per node per day.
• Message TTL of one day.
• Energy model for node batteries (following [18]):
2For LocShare, there are four one-week parts; we use each one-week segment with equal frequen-
cy. For SASSY and Reality Mining, we select one-week intervals where there are sufficient numbers
of nodes present for non-trivial routing to be possible.
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– Maximum energy: 1200 mAh; at the beginning of each simulation run,
each node is assigned a random amount of energy between zero and
this maximum.
– Energy loss per second: 1.9× 10−3 mAh.
– Energy per message sent/received3: 0.4 mAh.
– Nodes participate in the network until they run out of energy. They then
recharge offline for 8 hours, during which they do not participate in the
network, and return with full energy.
– Infinite buffers; no transmission loss.4
As in previous chapters, messages which arrive in zero-time (i.e., from a direct link
between the original sender and final recipient) are excluded from analysis; when
sender and recipient are in proximity, there are presumably more efficient forms of
communication than an opportunistic network. By excluding these transfers, we
are able to focus on network performance in non-trivial opportunistic scenarios.
6.3.2 Flooding attack modes
Following [30], we pick one node from the trace in each run to act as the attacker;
we do not add new attacker nodes because a model to generate synthetic node
movement traces is beyond the scope of this thesis. The attacker attempts to flood
the network with attack messages during encounters with other nodes. It does not
participate in relaying background traffic.
We simulate the following modes:
• Baseline: As a neutral measurement of the behaviour of the network (i.e.,
without the attack being performed), no attack messages are generated. (Here,
3We assume that the same amount of energy is used per message for each of the modes intro-
duced in Section 6.3.2, i.e., that the energy cost of signing a message or verifying a message signa-
ture is small in comparison to the fixed radio energy usage for exchanging the message.
4As detailed in Section 6.3.3, we focus on measuring message loss caused by overloaded nodes
which run out of energy. We only introduce this one source of message loss to avoid confounding
the results.
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the “baseline” is with respect to the attack being performed, rather than with
respect to a real-world traffic model.)
• Vulnerable: Simulation of the default behaviour of SRSNR, without any coun-
termeasures to the flooding attack. At each encounter, the attacker generates
100 spoofed messages.5 As discussed when introducing the attack, message
headers are spoofed to ensure that the message is (i) undeliverable (i.e., has
no real final destination node), and (ii) eligible to be relayed by any node.
• Resistant: Simulation of a passive defence scheme, as introduced in Section 6.2.2.
The attacker must sign each attack message, so messages are only relayed via
its genuine social contacts (friends). As for Vulnerable, the attacker sends 100
messages per encounter.
• ResistantBlocks: As for Resistant, but with an added active defence. Nodes
locally maintain counts of messages they have received from each other node
— with message origin verified since only signed messages from social con-
tacts are accepted. Each node locally looks for any abnormal nodes, i.e., any
node which has sent three standard deviations above the mean number of
messages. If such a node is detected, then it is blocked at the detecting node;
i.e., the node will discard further messages originating from this sender.
6.3.3 Metrics
To evaluate the efficacy of the attack, we use three metrics:
1. Proportion of the time that (non-attack) nodes spend offline recharging. For exam-
ple, if each node spends eight hours in every 24 hours recharging, then it is
offline recharging for 33% of the time.
2. Delivery ratio. The proportion of (non-attack) messages which arrive at their
intended destination.
5Some traces have artifacts, where a single logical encounter is stored as numerous, consecutive
physical encounters. For example, a Bluetooth scan may detect the same node during consecutive
scans. To avoid skewing results due to these artifacts, we limit the attacker to sending to encoun-
tered nodes no more than once every ten minutes.
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3. Delivery delay. The delay between the first transmission of a message, and its
first arrival at its intended final recipient node.
If the attack is successful in overloading network nodes, i.e., causing them to run
out of energy and fail, then we would expect the nodes to spend a greater propor-
tion of time offline recharging. We therefore use as a metric the proportion of the
time that the non-attack nodes spend offline recharging. The remaining two met-
rics — delivery ratio and delivery delay — are widely used as indicators of overall
network performance [75].
6.4 Results
Figures 6.1–6.3 show our simulation results.
We consider two ways to measure the success of the attack: by examining the
impact on individual nodes (with the metric of average proportion of time offline),
and on the overall network performance (delivery ratio and delivery delay).
6.4.1 Impact of the attack
To determine the impact of the attack, we compare the metrics for each dataset in
the Vulnerable mode, where the attack is performed, to the Baseline mode.
Figure 6.1(a) shows that there is a significant impact on nodes’ proportion of time
spent offline for the SASSY dataset. The attack has drained the nodes’ energy, caus-
ing them to lose power. The median proportion of offline time is 42.7% for the Vul-
nerable mode, compared to the Baseline mode’s 4.7%. For the sparsely-connected
Reality Mining dataset, Figure 6.2(a) shows a more modest — but again significant
— increase in node offline time, from 4.4% to 5.3%. The effect in the also-sparse
LocShare dataset, Figure 6.3(a), is similar: 4.5% to 5.3%.
We have seen that individual nodes are affected. Is the network performance as a
whole also impacted?
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(a) Proportion of offline time. The flood-
ing attack (Vulnerable mode) overloads
nodes, so they spend more time recharging
compared to the baseline (median: 42.7%
vs 4.7%). The passive (Resistant) and
active (ResistantBlocks) defences mitigate
this: median offline proportion falls to
15.1% and 6.3% respectively.

















(b) Delivery ratio. Overall network perfor-
mance, as measured by delivery ratio, falls
during the attack (from 98.2% to 82.7%).
The passive and active defences mitigate
the attack.


















(c) Delivery delay. The attack worsens per-
formance, increasing the delivery delay (3.3
hours to 6.5 hours). The passive and active
defences mitigate this impact.
Figure 6.1: SASSY dataset.
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(a) Proportion of offline time. In this sparse
dataset, the attack causes a more modest
— but still significant — increase in offline
time (4.4% to 5.3%). The defences mitigate
this.
















(b) Delivery ratio. There is no significant
difference in delivery ratios across the dif-
ferent modes.


















(c) Delivery delay. There is no signifi-
cant difference in delivery delays across the
modes.
Figure 6.2: Reality Mining dataset.
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(a) Proportion of offline time. In this sparse
dataset, the attack causes a more modest
— but still significant — increase in offline
time (4.5% to 5.3%). The defences mitigate
this.















(b) Delivery ratio. There is no significant
difference in delivery ratios across the dif-
ferent modes.


















(c) Delivery delay. There is no signifi-
cant difference in delivery delays across the
modes.
Figure 6.3: LocShare dataset.
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For the SASSY dataset, Figures 6.1(b)–6.1(c) show that there is a significant impact
on the overall delivery ratio and delivery delay. The median delivery ratio falls
from 98.2% to 82.7%, while delivery delay doubles from 3.3 hours to 6.5 hours. The
Reality Mining (Figures 6.2(b)–6.2(c)) and LocShare (Figures 6.3(b)–6.3(c)) datasets,
however, do not show a significant difference in network performance. We believe
this is a consequence of the datasets’ sparsity: the absolute delivery ratios are so
low and variable that any impact is lost in the noise.
Summarising, the attack significantly increases offline times for individual net-
work nodes. For the dense SASSY dataset, the overall network performance impact
is also directly measurable. This demonstrates the efficacy of the attack.
We also note that impacting the energy of individual nodes (i.e., the mobile devices
carried by network users) may discourage users’ participation in the network. By
theories such as Metcalfe’s Law and Reed’s Law [119], this may further reduce the
value of the network for other nodes.
6.4.2 Efficacy of the defence
The Resistant mode implements the passive defence, and ResistantBlocks the active
defence. By comparison to the Vulnerable mode, we can determine their efficacy.
From Figure 6.1(a), we can see that the defence effectively mitigates the effect of
the attack on nodes’ offline times for the SASSY dataset. Compared to a median
of 42.7% time offline for the Vulnerable mode, this falls to 15.1% with the Resistant
mode, and further to 6.3% with the ResistantBlocks mode — almost to the Baseline
level. A similar trend holds for the Reality Mining dataset (Figure 6.2(a)) and for
the LocShare dataset (Figure 6.3(a)). This is less pronounced, because the attack’s
impact was more moderate for these sparse datasets.
The network performance impact is also mitigated. For the SASSY dataset, Fig-
ures 6.1(b)–6.1(c) show an increased delivery ratio, and corresponding decreased
delivery delay, using the Resistant mode (82.7% to 97.0%, and 6.5 hours to 4.4
hours). With the active defence, ResistantBlocks, the performance is further improved,
to near-Baseline levels (97.6% delivery ratio, and 3.5 hours delivery delay). For the
104
Reality Mining and LocShare datasets, where the attack did not have a significant
effect on network performance, the defence still does not worsen performance.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered a flooding-based attack against opportunistic
networks. We have demonstrated via simulation that the attack can impact oppor-
tunistic network performance, both at the global level with reduced delivery ratio
and at the individual node level by draining nodes’ energy.
We have further introduced schemes to detect and mitigate the attack, using only
local social network information available at each node. We have demonstrated
through simulation that the schemes appear effective.
The mitigation, however, depends upon a new assumption. Specifically, we assume
the existence of some mechanism for out-of-band key distribution amongst socially-
connected nodes. On the one hand, this may seem a reasonable assumption. If
a node is “friends” with another node, then they may well have had sufficient
opportunity to exchange keys prior to encountering each other in an opportunistic
network scenario, for instance via meeting physically or through an infrastructure
network. On the other hand, by requiring keys to communicate, we may be imped-
ing potential uses of opportunistic communication. For instance, epidemic routing
applications such as emergency broadcast or content distribution, where nodes
send messages to any available node, are no longer possible. If epidemic routing
is allowed, then a recipient node may no longer be able to verify a sender’s key,
which means that malicious nodes could generate throwaway public-private key
pairs for forged nodes and so conduct the flooding attack.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Opportunistic networks rely on participant nodes cooperating to forward data
for one another. The decentralised and cooperative nature of such networks can
expose network users to privacy and security threats, which in turn may discour-
age their participation in the network. We have therefore examined the following
thesis:
Privacy and security threats within opportunistic networks can be miti-
gated through cooperative social behaviour, without reducing network
performance.
To test the thesis, we have considered the following questions:
Q1: How can we determine the performance impact of changes in behaviour due
to users’ privacy concerns, when we do not have a deployed opportunistic net-
work?
Q2: Can privacy and security concerns that arise through the use of opportunistic
networks be mitigated through cooperative social behaviour, while maintaining
network performance?
To address the first question, we have presented a methodology in Chapter 4 to use
empirically-measured privacy concerns from a simulated application in order to
simulate the potential performance impact on future opportunistic networks. We
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have shown that users’ location privacy concerns may have a significant impact on
network performance.
To address the second question, we have presented a privacy-aware routing proto-
col in Chapter 5, and a security-aware routing protocol in Chapter 6. Each protocol
relies on cooperative social behaviour, and is demonstrated to maintain network
performance.
7.1 Contributions
In Chapter 4, we examined the performance impact of users reducing their partici-
pation in opportunistic networks due to a perceived threat to location privacy. We
demonstrated using both synthetic and empirically-derived privacy models that
user behaviour can have a large impact on opportunistic network performance. In
the worst case, the opportunistic network performance (as measured by delivery
ratio) may fall to zero, implying that the network is useless. This implies that to
simultaneously respect users’ privacy preferences and maintain network perfor-
mance, privacy-enhanced routing protocols are required.
In Chapter 5, we considered how to create privacy-enhanced routing protocols,
to preserve a second type of privacy: social graph privacy. We introduced two
privacy-enhanced schemes — SSNR and OSNR — which can be used together.
The schemes are based on perturbing and obfuscating the social network infor-
mation used for social network routing, and can be used in the absence of key
management. We quantified the privacy gains of the schemes, and demonstrated
that they can be used while the performance of the network is maintained.
In Chapter 6, we demonstrated that it is possible to use social network information
to mitigate one particular threat to security, specifically a flooding attack aimed at
exhausting the finite energy of participating network nodes. We introduced an
assumption, that social contacts (“friends”) know one another’s signing keys, and
showed how to use this to authenticate messages passed through the network. We
demonstrated that the flooding attack can be mitigated by such a protocol, thus
maintaining or improving the opportunistic network performance.
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7.2 Discussion
In Chapter 4, in order to investigate the impact of location privacy preferences
on opportunistic network performance, we measure location privacy preferences
for heavy Facebook users and assume that similar privacy behaviours apply for
opportunistic network users. While we have argued in support of this assumption,
we can imagine factors that suggest future research should examine validation of
the assumption. For example, three factors which make affect privacy preferences
are: (i) Facebook users are identified by name, while opportunistic network users
are potentially pseudonymous; (ii) participants were prompted to choose priva-
cy preferences for precise locations (up to the granularity of GPS), rather than
for coarser locations as may be revealed in opportunistic network use; and (iii)
opportunistic network users may be willing to accept a trade-off of some priva-
cy in return for increased utility (e.g., improved network performance), which we
would not be able to detect using this methodology.
Additionally, it may be possible to extend further the analysis that we have per-
formed on the location privacy preference data collected in Chapter 4.4.3. For
example, we can imagine more sophisticated privacy models, which take account
of correlations between observed privacy preferences and other factors such as
place or time-of-day: some places at certain times of day may be considered more
sensitive information than others. Additional privacy modes could also be simu-
lated for opportunistic networks, beyond those which we have described.
In Chapter 5, we detailed modified social network routing protocols intended to
preserve privacy of opportunistic network users’ social relations. As noted in
Chapters 2.3.1 and 4.2, this can consequently help to preserve other types of pri-
vacy, such as location privacy, by hindering inference attacks. In Chapter 5.4, we
quantified the privacy improvements associated with using the schemes, including
discussing their limitations. In particular, we noted that the schemes keep honest
people honest, and increase the effort required for a determined adversary, but
are not infallible: given sufficient amounts of eavesdropped traffic, and computer
time, the privacy protection can potentially be broken.
Such attacks are inherently possible when perturbing or obfuscating social net-
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work information on a per-message basis, as we proposed. It may be possible to
hinder the attacks, however, by providing more consistently perturbed and obfus-
cated social network information. But this may introduce its own performance cost
— for example, if a particular social contact is always removed, in every message,
then no messages would be routed via that contact, which may produce a con-
sistent decline in performance if the contact is central within the network. Alter-
natively, if we can assume some extent of key distribution — as we do in Chap-
ter 6 — then it may be possible to increase privacy protection through encryption
rather than obfuscation, since social network information could be encrypted dur-
ing message exchange in order to thwart an eavesdropper. Even such a scheme,
however, would not be infallible: a compromised node, or curious social contact,
can still read the social network information used for routing — and more gener-
ally traffic analysis attacks may be possible.
In Chapter 6, we showed a mechanism to mitigate a flooding attack with a social
network routing protocol. The scheme proposed necessitated an assumption, how-
ever: that a degree of key distribution is present, so that immediate social contacts
(“friends”) can verify the origin of one another’s messages. We argued in sup-
port of this assumption, but testing the assumption would be challenging without
a real opportunistic network deployment. Additionally, through requiring such
an assumption, we may be impeding potential uses of opportunistic networks.
For example, content could not be disseminated to non-friends while using such a
scheme, since the core idea in the scheme is to accept messages from friends only.
Other considerations are that a more sophisticated attack may involve a trusted
node that has been compromised; if the private signing key is compromised then
it is possible to spoof message origin. The ResistantBlocks mode described in Chap-
ter 6.3.2 could mitigate this to some extent, by detecting abnormal traffic appear-
ing to originate from a “trusted” node — but at the expense of rejecting other mes-
sages from that node too, which may be authentic. Lower-level wireless attacks are
also still possible, for example jamming or wireless flooding attacks. The scheme
described does not mitigate such lower-layer attacks.
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7.3 Future work
We conclude by noting potential new questions and avenues for future work, fol-
lowing on from the research presented in this thesis.
One natural extension would be to investigate combining the schemes presented
in Chapters 5 (for preserving privacy) and 6 (for mitigating a flooding attack) into
a unified opportunistic network routing protocol. Would it be possible to improve
the privacy-preserving features of the protocol if we can assume, as in Chapter 6,
that friends know one another’s encryption keys? Or can we maintain the privacy
defences while still being able to mitigate flooding attacks? We highlight these
questions for future research.
A second natural extension would be to further investigate the relationship between
location privacy (as was the focus in Chapter 4) and social graph privacy (as was
the focus in Chapter 5). We discussed how these two types of privacy are entwined
in Chapters 2.3.1 and 4.2; could we formalise this link further? In particular, would
it be possible to quantify the extent to which location privacy concerns are allayed
through improving social graph privacy — and in turn quantify the performance
impact?
The focus in Chapters 4–6 has been on SRSN Routing (SRSNR). An additional
avenue for research would be applying similar privacy and security techniques
to other social network routing schemes, some additional examples of which we
have discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, we note that SSNR relies on “all-or-
nothing” binary friendship: two given users are either friends or they are not
friends. A future area to explore would be whether we can find privacy-preserving
or security-preserving schemes for social network routing protocols which involve
graduated degrees of friendship, such as varying tie strengths, or which utilise
indirect friends-of-friends.
While the simulations described in Chapters 4–6 rely on empirically-measured
encounters and social network information, the traffic generation pattern is ran-
dom, and not based on real data. Messages are unicast, between a randomly-
selected sender and one of their randomly-chosen social contacts. Future work
might investigate routing performance when using traffic patterns based on real-
110
world data, or where some or all messages may be multicast.
We have focused in this thesis on a sample of specific privacy and security threats:
location privacy in Chapter 4, social graph privacy in Chapter 5, and a particu-
lar flooding attack with message amplification in Chapter 6. This is not a com-
prehensive account of all privacy and security threats in opportunistic networks,
leaving room for further research in this space. For example, one class of securi-
ty problem that we have not considered in this thesis is selfishness. Nodes may
wish to selfishly “freeload”, by relying on other nodes to forward data on their
behalf without participating in message forwarding themselves. Research is ongo-
ing into adding incentives and reputations to opportunistic network forwarding
(e.g., IRONMAN in [19]). A unified scheme — combining incentives, privacy-
awareness and security-awareness across many types of threat — would be an
ideal to strive towards in future research. A significant amount of future research
is likely required in order to realise this.
Finally, we note that much opportunistic networking research in general — includ-
ing that presented in this thesis — relies upon using relatively-few small-scale
datasets. Would the results we have presented generalise to larger datasets, or
particularly a real deployment? Could we obtain new insights by using larger
datasets, or by studying a real deployment? We highlight such general questions




A.1.1 St Andrews mobile sensor network (SASSY)
The first dataset was collected at St Andrews from a deployed sensor network sys-
tem, the St Andrews Sensing SYstem (SASSY), in a previous experiment by Big-
wood et al. [20]. 25 participants were equipped with 802.15.4 Tmote Invent sensor
motes and encounters were tracked for a period of 79 days, although for efficiency
we chose to use only the first 30-day section of this trace for our simulations.
The original dataset was very sparse due to hardware limitations which meant that
many encounters may have been missed. Inspired by [54] and [59], Bigwood aug-
mented the collected traces using a working-day and augmented random-waypoint
model. Nodes randomly select a waypoint from a set of points of interest and walk
according to predetermined paths (such as roads) to reach these points. Nodes
moved at 0.5–1.5ms−1. At each waypoint the nodes could stop for 0–120s. Each
node was additionally randomly assigned a home location, and the nodes would
travel to this location to “sleep” for 8 hours in every 24. Each node had an addition-
al 10% probability of either visiting the Computer Science departmental buildings
(since our participants were mainly Computer Science students) or their “home”
at any waypoint selection.
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To obtain social network information for the SASSY dataset, we use the self-reported
social network information provided by the 25 participants at the start of the exper-
iment: their Facebook “friends”. Many participants knew each other: the mean
friends list size (i.e., number of Facebook friends also participating in the experi-
ment) was 9.8, with a standard deviation of 5.0.
A.1.2 MIT Reality Mining (Reality Mining)
The well-known Reality Mining dataset [52] was collected at MIT [53]. This dataset
comprises Bluetooth encounter traces from 97 mobile phone users over the course
of an academic year. To obtain social network information for this dataset, we use
the participants’ address book information.
Although the Reality Mining dataset does not explicitly record participants’ address
books, we are able to infer address book information based on the included data.
For each participant, the dataset includes a log of outgoing contacts (phone calls
and SMS messages), along with both a pseudonymised contacted phone number
and a flag to indicate whether this phone number is in the participant’s address
book. By matching the pseudonymised contacted phone number to that of another
Reality Mining participant, we thus use the address book flag to determine whether
the first participant has the second participant in their address book.
We construct the friends lists based on the address book information by defining
that if at least one participant has the other in their address book, then the pair are
said to be friends, i.e., each has the other in their friends list. Unlike the SASSY
dataset, few participants knew each other: 52 participants had at least two other
participants in their friends lists (and were thus candidate nodes for social-network
routing in our simulations). Of these 52 participants, the mean friends list size is
3.7, with a standard deviation of 2.0.
Because of differing lengths of participation in the experiment,1 we could not treat
the dataset as one contiguous trace — it would not be meaningful to simulate
message-passing between people no longer participating in the study. Therefore,
1Some participants carried mobile phones for the full nine months of data collection, while
others participated for much lower amounts of time — as low as one month.
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at the beginning of each simulation run, we draw out a random2 30-day segment
of the trace.
A.1.3 LocShare
The LocShare dataset [14] was collected at St Andrews, as previously described
in Chapter 4.4.1. While the lead researcher for collecting the dataset was Fehmi
Ben Abdesslem, I contributed significantly (approximately equally) towards the
experiment’s implementation and collection of the raw data. I did not contribute
towards collecting raw data for the other datasets used within this thesis.
We collected the locations of 80 participants during four one-week runs of 20 par-
ticipants. By defining an encounter as occurring when two participants are within
10 metres — selected as this is the approximate average Bluetooth range — we
obtain a trace of encounters between participants. As for the SASSY dataset, social
network information was obtained from Facebook friendships.
While the primary purpose in collecting the dataset was to develop empirical pri-
vacy models (see Chapter 4.4.1), we also collected location data and social net-
work information of participants. We therefore were able to construct a further
dataset suitable for opportunistic network simulations, which we have made pub-
licly available to other researchers [13].
A.1.4 NUS student contacts (NUS)
While the previous three datasets are the standard datasets used for evaluation
throughout this thesis, we also include additional supplementary results in Chap-
ter 5 only for an additional dataset, a student contact pattern dataset comprising
the class schedules of 22,341 students at the National University of Singapore [133]
(NUS).
2 The only constraint placed on the selection of the random 30-day segment which we draw out
is that at least three participants, each with at least two other participants in their friends list, must
be carrying phones throughout the 30 day period — otherwise meaningful social-network routing
could not occur (since there would be no message-passing intermediaries).
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The dataset describes contacts between students in recurring weekly sessions. As
in the original paper describing the dataset [132], we regard an encounter between
two students as occurring when these students share a session — that is, when
the students are in physical proximity in the same classroom. The assumption
that data exchange is possible between two proximal mobile devices, even inside
large classrooms, was experimentally validated in [132]. We regard two students
as having one another as social contacts, so having one another in each of their
respective friends lists, if they share at least one session in the week. Defining
social links in this way, the mean friends list size is 561, with a standard deviation
of 396.
Due to memory constraints, we do not perform simulations in Chapter 5 using
the full NUS dataset: the full dataset contains 12.3M encounters and 6.2M social
network links. Instead, we sample a subset of students from the full dataset in
two different ways, to derive two new, smaller datasets. In each case, after extract-
ing a subset of the students, we preserve all encounters and social network links
between students within this subset.
1. We randomly select 500 students from the full 22,341 students in the NUS
dataset. We call this derived dataset NUS-R. Results from this dataset may
reflect a real-world opportunistic network deployment, where only a propor-
tion of students participate in the opportunistic network.
2. A downside of randomly selecting students from the full NUS dataset is that
doing so leads to a relatively sparse social graph. Therefore, we adopt the
approach of Liu and Wu [96] to sample the NUS dataset in a second way,
which avoids the extremes of sparsity (as occurs when randomly sampling
students) or over-connectedness in the new, derived, size-reduced dataset.
We select the first student randomly, and then, to select the kth student, we
randomly divide the previously-selected k− 1 students into two equal-sized
groups S1 and S2, and select the kth student as that student with the highest
∑s1∈S1 sim(s, s1)−∑s2∈S2 sim(s, s2) where sim is the number of common class
sessions in which two students are enrolled. Using Liu and Wu’s approach,
we sample 500 students from the full NUS dataset. We call this derived
dataset NUS-L.
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Dataset




SASSY 25 25 0.771 254 29,909
Reality Mining 97 75 0.318 107 32,359
LocShare 80 64 0.470 81 2,400
NUS 22 341 22 340 0.536 6,261,458 12,320,946
NUS-L 500 500 0.634 29,743 71,819
NUS-R 500 476 0.506 3,001 6,109
Table A.1: Dataset statistics. All fields refer to properties of the social network,
except for the number of encounters.
For NUS-R, the mean friends list size is 12.0, with a standard deviation of 8.54. For
NUS-L, the mean friends list size is 119, with a standard deviation of 39.9. The
wide difference in mean friends list size (while the absolute number of nodes is
the same at 500) is an expected outcome from the different natures of the two NUS
sampling methods, and provides an initial illustration of the differing properties
of the derived datasets.
A.2 Dataset statistics
Table A.1 provides an overall description of the datasets used for evaluation; we
have a chosen a variety of datasets which vary in size, timescale and density. This
is further confirmed by visualisations of the various social networks within these
datasets (Figure A.1) and the degree distributions of these social networks (Fig-
ure A.2), which indicate variety in the network structures. We therefore believe
that these datasets provide a range of suitable test cases for opportunistic network
performance simulations.
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(a) SASSY dataset. (b) Reality Mining dataset.
(c) LocShare dataset. (d) NUS dataset.
(e) NUS-L dataset. (f) NUS-R dataset.
Figure A.1: The social networks from the three datasets used for evaluation. The
NUS dataset, Figure A.1(d), was sampled in two different ways to derive two dif-
ferent datasets — Figure A.1(e) and Figure A.1(f).

























Figure A.2: Cumulative degree distributions for the datasets (log-log plot). Our
datasets have a wide variance in their cumulative degree distributions.
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−20 2.2×10−1 6.5×10−1 7.0×10−1 9.4×10−1 6.1×10−1
0 4.7×10−1 1.4×100 1.0×100 2.0×100 1.3×100
20 8.8×10−1 1.8×100 1.4×100 3.4×100 2.4×100
40 1.4×100 4.5×100 2.9×100 5.3×100 3.7×100
60 2.2×100 5.2×100 3.8×100 7.6×100 5.4×100
80 2.8×100 8.0×100 7.7×100 1.0×101 7.8×100
100 3.2×100 1.0×101 8.2×100 1.4×101 9.8×100
120 3.7×100 1.2×101 8.1×100 1.7×101 1.3×101
140 4.1×100 1.7×101 1.5×101 2.1×101 1.6×101
160 4.3×100 1.7×101 1.8×101 2.4×101 1.9×101
180 4.7×100 2.3×101 2.1×101 2.8×101 2.3×101
200 4.9×100 2.6×101 2.2×101 3.1×101 2.6×101
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